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WILD WESTWORLD:  SECTION 230 
OF THE CDA AND SOCIAL NETWORKS’ 
USE OF MACHINE-LEARNING ALGORITHMS 
Catherine Tremble* 
 
On August 10, 2016, a complaint filed in the Eastern District of New York 
accused Facebook of aiding the execution of terrorist attacks.  The complaint 
depicted user-generated posts and groups promoting and directing the 
perpetration of terrorist attacks.  Under § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, interactive service providers (ISPs), such as Facebook, cannot 
be held liable for user-generated content where the ISP did not create or 
develop the content at issue.  However, this complaint stands out because it 
seeks to hold Facebook liable not only for the content of third parties but also 
for the effect its personalized machine-learning algorithms—or “services”—
have had on the ability of terrorists to execute attacks.  In alleging that 
Facebook’s actual services, as well as its publication of content, allow 
terrorists to more effectively execute attacks, the complaint seeks to negate 
the applicability of § 230 immunity. 
This Note argues that Facebook’s services—specifically the 
personalization of content through machine-learning algorithms—constitute 
the “development” of content and as such do not qualify for § 230 immunity.  
This Note analyzes the evolution of § 230 jurisprudence to help inform the 
development of a revised framework.  This framework is guided by 
congressional and public policy goals and creates brighter lines for 
technological immunity.  It tailors immunity to account for user data mined 
by ISPs and the pervasive effect that the use of that data has on users—two 
issues that courts have yet to confront.  This Note concludes that under the 
revised framework, machine-learning algorithms’ content organization—
made effective through the collection of individualized data—make ISPs 
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INTRODUCTION 
To say that every online interaction you have is curated to influence the 
way you live and how you feel is hyperbolic.  However, to say that one 
website has the influence and reach to determine the political landscape of 
the United States1 or that that same site may be responsible for your foul 
mood on Monday evening2 is not as alarmist as it first sounds.  You might be 
incredulous, but both voter turnout and behavioral studies conducted on 
unsuspecting subjects in real time on the Facebook platform have 
demonstrated these hypotheticals are capable of becoming reality.3 
Facebook attained this influence on users’ behavior and mood through the 
use of machine-learning algorithms.4  The impact of machine-learning 
algorithms has not been concretely quantified,5 but studies highlight one 
definite trend:  human decision-making is intensely susceptible to their 
influence.6  Machine-learning algorithms’ subtle but pervasive influence 
alters human behavior and, to a certain extent, the human experience.7  The 
increasing ubiquity of machine learning has not gone unnoticed.  Even 
technologists are hesitant about the loss of human autonomy that comes with 
the implementation of machine learning.8  Although the effects of this 
 
 1. See Adam Rogers, Google’s Search Algorithm Could Steal the Presidency, WIRED 
(Aug. 6, 2015, 1:24 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/googles-search-algorithm-steal-
presidency/ [https://perma.cc/MM2Z-4ALM] (describing a study in which Facebook exposed 
sixty-one million people to a message encouraging them to vote during the 2010 congressional 
elections, which generated 340,000 extra voters).  This influence has raised concerns regarding 
the ability to create a type of “digital gerrymandering” by only targeting those users Facebook 
predicts are most likely to vote for certain candidates. Id.; see Zoe Corbyn, Facebook 
Experiment Boosts US Voter Turnout, NATURE (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.nature.com/ 
news/facebook-experiment-boosts-us-voter-turnout-1.11401 [https://perma.cc/7KKJ-FPFG]. 
 2. It is not just a case of the Mondays.  Facebook conducted a study, unbeknownst to 
users, which demonstrated that users’ moods and behaviors were directly influenced by the 
tone of their newsfeeds.  Positive newsfeeds yielded positive posts, and negative newsfeeds 
yielded negative posts. See Adam D.I. Kramer et al., Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale 
Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PNAS 8788, 8789 (2014). 
 3. See id.; see also Corbyn, supra note 1. 
 4. See Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook Feed, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2016, 8:02 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2016/01/how_facebook_s_news_feed
_algorithm_works.html [https://perma.cc/3URB-NFW2]. 
 5. See Jason Tanz, Soon We Won’t Program Computers.  We’ll Train Them Like Dogs, 
WIRED (May 17, 2016, 6:50 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/the-end-of-code/ 
[https://perma.cc/FM5G-EH48] (noting that these algorithms do not abide by traditional 
coding rules, but instead operate more like a human brain, which makes them more opaque 
and harder to understand). 
 6. See Corbyn, supra note 1; see also Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 8789; infra Part 
I.C.2. 
 7. For further discussion on the actual neurological effects technological dependency has 
on human brains and behaviors, see generally NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE:  
AUTOMATION AND US (2014). 
 8. See Tanz, supra note 5 (“‘Instead of being masters of our creations, we have learned 
to bargain with them, cajoling and guiding them in the general direction of our goals . . . .’  
This can all be pretty frightening.” (quoting Danny Hillis, The Enlightenment Is Dead, Long 
Live the Entanglement, PUBPUB (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.pubpub.org/pub/enlightenment-
to-entanglement [https://perma.cc/VRZ2-HWE7])); see also CARR, supra note 7, at 2 
(“[A]utomation also has deeper, hidden effects. . . .  It can narrow our perspectives and limit 
our choices.”). 
828 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
technology are constantly being revealed, the application of knowledge of 
behavioral influence to legal theories of liability remains untested in the 
courts for a host of reasons detailed below.9 
Though Facebook and other interactive service providers (ISPs)10 are 
commonly used as trading posts for illegal goods and services,11 they are 
rarely held liable for aiding unlawful enterprises.  If Facebook were an offline 
publication or service, it would face intermediary liability.  This theory of 
liability, traditionally assigned to publishers, allows a victim to hold the third-
party disseminator of information liable for a content provider’s 
misconduct.12 
Facebook, however, has avoided intermediary liability for three main 
reasons:  First, because most algorithms are proprietary technology, people 
are unaware of both the potential influence and harm to which they are 
exposed.13  Second, the use of machine-learning technology and the studies 
demonstrating its mood- and behavior-altering influence only reach back as 
far as 2007 and 2012, respectively, giving legal experts little time to assess 
 
 9. One of the first complaints to address the issue of liability for algorithms deployed on 
a social network is being adjudicated in the courts as of the date of publication of this Note. 
See Complaint at 16, Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 1:16-cv-04453 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2016) 
[hereinafter Cohen Complaint].  This complaint and a related consolidated complaint were 
dismissed for lack of standing and due to the court’s finding that Facebook was entitled to 
complete immunity under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act.  Cohen v. Facebook, 
Inc., Nos. 16-CV-4453 (NGG) (LB), 16-CV-5158 (NGG) (LB), 2017 WL 2192621, at *15 
(E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017).  The only cases that consider machine-learning algorithms to date 
are search engine defamation lawsuits, in which § 230 immunity has applied across the board. 
See Michael L. Smith, Note, Search Engine Liability for Autocomplete Defamation:  
Combating the Power of Suggestion, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 313, 314 (discussing 
former First Lady of Germany Bettina Wulff’s attempt to sue Google in Germany for 
autocompletes that suggested she was an “escort”).  These search engine cases are 
distinguishable from social network cases on numerous grounds.  The business goals, services 
offered, relationships to users, and freedom of the user to control his or her data differ in kind 
between social networks and search engines; as such, they do not provide dispositive 
precedent.  Those factors are all relevant in determining whether a company’s actions are 
deserving of § 230 immunity. 
 10. The term “interactive service providers” (ISPs) refers to online platforms that provide 
interactive services. 
 11. See, e.g., Felicia Bolton & WMCActionNews5.com Staff, Child Porn Posted to 
Facebook, Those Responsible Face Felony Charges, WMCACTIONNEWS5.COM (May 30, 2015, 
3:14 PM), http://www.wmcactionnews5.com/story/29193793/child-porn-posted-to-facebook-
those-responsible-face-felony-charges [https://perma.cc/A4WY-JN65] (tracking the 
investigation of two men who posted photos of underage students on Facebook in violation of 
criminal laws); see also Alex Heath, People Are Already Selling Drugs, Animals, and Adult 
Services on Facebook’s New Craigslist Competitor, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 3, 2016, 5:01 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-marketplace-drugs-animals-adult-services-2016-
10 [https://perma.cc/9HAQ-Z7X7] (noting the wide variety of illegal and bizarre postings that 
have popped up on Facebook’s new marketplace product).  
 12. See K.A. Taipale, Secondary Liability on the Internet:  Towards a Performative 
Standard for Constitutive Responsibility (Ctr. for Advanced Stud., Working Paper No. 04-
2003, 2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=712101 [https://perma.cc/9XRQ-JAFG]. 
 13. See, e.g., The Age of the Algorithm, 99% INVISIBLE (Sept. 5, 2017), 
http://www.99percentinvisible.org/episode/the-age-of-the-algorithm/ 
[https://perma.cc/C9QS-8ZCF] (noting that “[c]omputer algorithms now shape our world in 
profound and mostly invisible ways”); see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY:  
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 8 (2015). 
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appropriate legal theories to apply in cases that arise.14  Third, and most 
important, ISPs enjoy broad immunity under § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA), which bars most claims against online intermediaries 
in the early pleading stages.15  These three factors converge to create a new 
“Wild West” of internet regulation,16 a realm in which an ISP will almost 
never face civil or criminal liability for the content it hosts, even when its 
curated content may increase the impetus to engage in illegal activities. 
Section 230 of the CDA provides that where an ISP hosts user-generated 
content, none of it—however illegal—implicates the provider in the way a 
traditional publisher would be implicated.  Instead, liability lies with the 
“information content provider,”17 a term that encompasses anyone who 
“create[s] or develop[s]”18 the content at issue.  It is possible for an ISP to 
have protection as the provider of an interactive service and to lose that 
protection if the ISP created or developed the offending content.19  Judges, 
guided by the congressional findings and policies provided in the statute,20 
have read the immunity provision broadly to protect against issues ranging 
from traditional defamation liability21 to failure-to-warn claims for 
connecting users to sexual abusers.22  In most cases the legal claim at issue 
is not addressed; such is the strength of § 230 immunity.23  Recent years have 
chipped away at this expansive interpretation, however, and judges have 
begun to distill the importance of noting the ISP’s actual involvement in the 
content and conduct at issue. 
By drawing on several courts’ analyses of § 230 immunity,24 this Note 
examines the complex and novel legal situation that arises when a social 
media company is allegedly liable for the effective radicalization of its users, 
not via third-party content, but through its own individualized and influential 
content curation.25  This Note also examines the claim that the 
 
 14. For an example of one of the first articles proposing a new type of liability regime 
specific to online intermediaries, see generally Marcelo Thompson, Beyond Gatekeeping:  The 
Normative Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 783 (2016). 
 15. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 16. See 142 CONG. REC. S1646 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Exon) (“Before 
the passage of the Communications Decency Act, the Internet had been described as the Wild 
West.”). 
 17. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining the term “information content provider” as “any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the immunity is not without limitation). 
 20. 47 U.S.C § 230(b)(1)–(5). 
 21. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 22. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Doe II v. 
MySpace Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 151 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 23. See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125. 
 24. See infra Part II.C–D. 
 25. See Thompson, supra note 14, at 797 (“Intermediaries are the designers of the heart 
valves through which the lifeblood of our information environment flows.  Actions they take 
or refrain from taking can fundamentally alter medium and message, structure and content of 
information we impart and receive.  In other words, intermediaries can transform the very 
constitution of the environments we inhabit and the lives we live therein.” (footnote omitted)). 
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algorithmically driven connective services26 effectively aid offline 
radicalization by creating connections among radicalized users and 
promoting their inclusion in extremist events and groups. 
This Note ultimately seeks to determine whether machine-learning 
algorithms providing individualized content continue to qualify as services 
envisioned for protection under § 230;27 or whether courts should recognize 
the rapidly growing distinction between traditional media and new 
individualized and predictive media to create liability schemes that best 
comport with the public interest and align with legislative purpose.28  
Ultimately, it concludes that § 230 immunity should not be interpreted to 
protect machine-learning algorithms for the sake of convenience.  Instead, 
§ 230 must be interpreted to give meaning to its language and to bolster the 
legislative intent to withhold immunity from creators and codevelopers of 
content where their technology aids individuals and groups in their extremist 
agendas on social media.  Such an interpretation may necessarily find that 
immunity cannot, in fact, be granted where machine-learning technology is 
employed in conjunction with user-generated content. 
Part I begins with a look at the cases that inspired the CDA and an 
examination of the congressional findings29 and policy goals30 undergirding 
this law.  Part I then outlines the development of the algorithm and its 
influence on Facebook’s growth as a social media platform.  Next, Part II 
explores the judicial evolution of § 230 doctrine, highlighting the important 
factors courts analyze when addressing a platform’s eligibility for immunity. 
Part III proposes an updated framework for analyzing § 230 immunity and 
applies this framework to determine whether social media platforms that use 
machine-learning algorithms should be granted immunity.  This reenvisioned 
framework is applied to the facts in Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.,31 where 
plaintiffs sought to implicate Facebook for aiding terrorist connections, 
meetings, and event attendance through its ability to curate engaging content 
for each user’s predicted interests through negligence claims and claims 
under the statute prohibiting material support to designated foreign terrorist 
 
 26. The term “connective services” refers to services that recommend groups, friends, or 
activities to the user without any prompting. 
 27. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4) (2012).  
 28. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 14, at 802 (differentiating online intermediaries by 
the amount of control they have over content and noting that online-intermediary immunity 
does not create a regime that is grounded in normative concerns of justice).  Thompson 
advocates for an approach that asks what justice requires of intermediaries.  Specifically, he 
notes that state action should occur “whenever social forms of harm leave us without a 
meaningful range of options based on which to author our lives” through actions that have 
“the ‘forward-looking aspect’ of ‘diminishing our prospects’, of ‘adversely affecting our 
possibilities.’” Id. (quoting JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 108 (1986)). 
 29. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (stating Congress’s findings that the internet:  (1) has huge 
educational and informational value, (2) has a diversity of viewpoints and cultures that 
stimulate intellectual curiosity, and (3) requires very little interference from government to 
function well). 
 30. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b); see also id. § 230(a). 
 31. Nos. 16-CV-4453 (NGG) (LB), 16-CV-5158 (NGG) (LB), 2017 WL 2192621 
(E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017). 
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organizations (FTOs).32  This Part focuses on answering two questions.  The 
first is whether algorithmic-based services—which include Facebook’s 
“conduct” of connecting people based on their interests—are properly 
categorized as the “conduct” of a publisher and as such qualify for immunity.  
The second is whether the effects of algorithmic influence on users, in 
combination with the ISP’s intent to engage users as effectively as possible, 
constitutes codevelopment of the content shown to users.  Finally, Part III 
discusses the policy rationales behind withholding immunity in cases where 
algorithmically manipulated content or the conduct of the ISP is at issue.  
This Part assesses the competing concerns of the administrability of online-
intermediary liability with the importance of transparency concerning 
algorithms with behavioral influence. 
I.  SPURRING INTERNET GROWTH:  THE CDA’S CREATION AND INTERNET 
INNOVATIONS THAT FLOURISHED AFTER ITS PASSAGE 
After outlining the historical events and political motivations that formed 
the basis for the Communications Decency Act (CDA), this Part outlines 
Facebook’s evolving technology and corresponding growth in the post-CDA 
world.  Part I.A provides the legislative background courts use to justify their 
decisions.  Part I.B then briefly explains how Facebook’s machine-learning 
algorithms function.  Finally, Part I.C traces the evolution of Facebook from 
a startup to a Fortune 500 company that arrests the attention of its users with 
ever-increasing ingenuity and precision.  Facebook’s growth reveals how and 
why machine-learning algorithms are developed and their intended and 
actual effects on users, which will serve as important considerations when 
applying § 230 in Part III. 
A.  Cleaning Up the Internet:  The Passage of the CDA 
This Part discusses the two cases that spurred the creation of the CDA.  
These cases created a liability scheme that could have stunted the growth of 
the internet writ large.  But Congress’s actions to correct the untenable 
liability scheme created by the application of common law principles to ISPs 
allowed the internet to flourish instead of flounder.  This section discusses 
the drafting attempts to promote constitutionally protected speech online 
while limiting the harmful—and sometimes illegal—content available 
online. 
1.  Untenable Online Liability:  The Tension Created by 
Stratton and Cubby 
Section 230 was written to remedy the asymmetrical application of 
intermediary liability to ISPs.  In the fledgling period of the internet, any 
company that allowed users to freely post comments on its online platform 
 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).  See generally Cohen Complaint, supra note 9; see 
also Complaint, Force v. Facebook, No. 1:16-cv-05158 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016) [hereinafter 
Force Complaint]. 
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exposed itself to massive liability.33  Under intermediary liability, ISPs were 
liable for any content on their sites, such as defamatory comments by users, 
if the site exercised any type of editorial power over any comments—even 
deletion.34 
For example, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,35 Prodigy, 
the site host, was found liable as the “publisher” of statements posted by a 
third-party user of their online bulletin Money Talk.36  The court held that 
because Prodigy used an automated screening tool for offensive language and 
removed some offending content, it acted as a “publisher” and was liable for 
the defamatory statements posted.37  The holding extended common law 
publisher liability (a specific type of intermediary liability) to online services. 
This ruling created an incentive for ISPs to forgo monitoring entirely to 
escape publisher liability.38  This reality was realized in Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe, Inc.,39 where a company escaped liability for a user’s 
defamatory statements because it acted merely as a “distributor” of the 
information.40  Because CompuServe had not altered the post in question and 
did not remove or alter content generally, it was not considered a publisher.41  
Instead, the court compared CompuServe to a bookstore, a common example 
of a distributor.42  To establish intermediary liability of a distributor under 
common law, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual 
knowledge of defamation.43  Thus, Stratton controlled and the ISP was liable 
where an ISP attempted to remove offensive content; but where the ISP did 
 
 33. See generally Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 
323710, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 34. Id.; see also David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels:  An 
Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 392 n.74 (2010) (noting that contributory liability, the form of 
intermediary liability commonly at issue in CDA cases, “applies when a party ‘with 
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing 
conduct of another’” (quoting Gershwin Publ’g v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1162 (2d Cir. 1971))).  Ardia also notes that, “[i]n the criminal context, aiding-and-abetting 
and conspiracy may also create secondary liability for intermediaries.  Under secondary 
liability doctrines, intermediaries generally do not take on an affirmative duty to act or to 
prevent tortious or illegal conduct, but only a duty not to facilitate known wrongdoing.” Id. 
 35. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 36. Id. at *6. 
 37. Id.  
 38. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding 
that the online platform was not liable for libel as a distributor where it neither knew nor had 
reason to know of the libelous posting). 
 39. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. (“Ordinarily, ‘one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is 
subject to liability as if he had originally published it. . . .’  With respect to entities such as 
news vendors, book stores, and libraries, however, ‘New York courts have long held that 
vendors and distributors of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither know nor 
have reason to know of the defamation.’” (first quoting Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 
F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980); then quoting Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 
228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981))). 
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not attempt to remove content, there was no liability under CompuServe.44  
The common law created a regime where ISPs were better served by leaving 
offensive or defamatory information online because removing it created 
liability. 
Congress recognized that these cases created untenable liability for newly 
emerging internet businesses and the perverse incentive to refrain from 
removing or editing inappropriate content.45  To prevent the shadow of 
liability from chilling commerce and to incentivize filtering inappropriate 
content, Congress passed § 230 of the CDA in 1996 as part of a greater 
attempt to purify the internet.46  Section 230(c) absolved online platforms of 
liability in which they were treated as the “publisher or speaker” of the 
information, in an effort to encourage the filtration and removal of 
inappropriate and illegal content.47 
2.  The Congressional Solution:  
Immunity for “Good Samaritans” 
The CDA began as an attempt to purify the internet of its amassed catalog 
of indecent content.48  Senator J. James Exon introduced the Act to curtail 
the growing access to pornography that the internet abetted.49  Through § 223 
of the CDA, Exon proposed to extend common-carrier indecency laws to 
 
 44. See id.  
 45. See infra Part I.A.2.a. 
 46. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 133, 
137 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)) (stating that the first policy goal was “to promote the 
continued development of the Internet”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (stating that the 
second policy goal was “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet”). 
 47. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 48. This characterization of the internet was supported by a study published in the 
Georgetown Law Review that proclaimed that the internet was comprised of 83.5 percent 
pornography. See Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway:  
A Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 
Million Times by Consumers in over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and 
Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1867 (1995).  The study was subsequently deemed 
scientifically flawed. See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s 
Communications Decency Act:  Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 
FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 55 n.16 (1996).  However, the characterization persisted and heavily 
influenced Senate votes in favor of the CDA as they did not want to appear “pro-pornography.” 
See id. at 64. 
 49. See 141 CONG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Exon) (noting 
that the internet could be kept from becoming a “red light district” by extending “the standards 
of decency which have protected telephone users to new telecommunications devices”). 
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ISPs.50  It passed in the Senate by a large margin51 but was met with pushback 
in the House,52 as it would allow the FCC to determine the meaning of 
decency on the internet, criminalize vast swaths of speech,53 and was unlikely 
to pass constitutional muster.54  In keeping with the spirit of protecting 
society from indecency while simultaneously limiting the government 
regulation of the internet, Representatives Jim Cox and Ron Wyden created 
§ 230.55 
Cox and Wyden used § 230 to reverse the liability regime established in 
Stratton, which was the major obstacle to promoting private filtration of 
indecent content.56  They sought to establish the freedom for private actors 
to determine, without civil liability, what constituted indecency without 
government interference.57  ISPs supported this approach as a way to avoid 
 
 50. See Cannon, supra note 48, at 57 (“The CDA . . . extends the antiharassment, 
indecency, and antiobscenity restrictions currently placed on telephone calls to 
‘telecommunications devices’ and ‘interactive computer services.’”).  This legislation made it 
illegal to “knowingly send to or display in a manner available to ‘a person under 18 years of 
age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in 
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user 
of such service placed the call or initiated the communication.’” Id. at 58 (quoting 47 
U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B)). 
 51. See Roll Call Vote 104th Congress—1st Session, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=104
&session=1&vote=00263 [https://perma.cc/RV2R-MP5P] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) 
(showing Sen. Exon’s proposal passing by a vote of 84-16). 
 52. See Cannon, supra note 48, at 66 (characterizing the House reception of the CDA as 
“frigid”).  The House had recently taken an affirmative step toward integrating with the 
internet, and deregulation was also a top priority. See Cannon, supra note 48, at 53; Ann Reilly 
Dowd, The Net’s Surprising Swing to the Right, FORTUNE (July 10, 1995), 
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1995/07/10/204243/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PG9G-VDLN] (noting a successful initiative to post all congressional 
legislation records online). 
 53. See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden) 
(noting that Senator Exon’s Act would take the task of defining indecent communications 
away from communities, resting it in the hands of the government). 
 54. See id. at H8472 (statement of Rep. Goodlate) (finding that the Cox-Wyden 
amendment likely “doesn’t violate free speech or the right of adults to communicate with each 
other”). 
 55. See id. (statement of Rep. Wyden) (stating that the law should provide relief from 
indecency on the web “without Federal regulation” being involved). 
 56. H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep) (“One of the specific purposes of 
this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which 
have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own 
because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”); see also David Lukmire, Can 
the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?:  The Reverberations of Zeran v. America 
Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 380 (2010). 
 57. Contrary to what is stated as the primary reasoning for the statute in many cases, the 
driving force behind the Cox-Wyden amendment was more likely the result of Congress’s 
desire to keep the internet free of regulation than its desire to protect robust free speech. See 
Lukmire, supra note 56, at 380–81 (“Representatives Cox and Wyden envisioned that their 
amendment would discourage bureaucratic oversight and thereby encourage the robust growth 
of the Internet, largely by avoiding the unappetizing regulatory implications of Senator Exon’s 
proposal.  Their prevailing aim was not to create a liability shield . . . .”). 
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the chilling effects of Stratton’s intermediary liability.58  When the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down the criminalization of indecency in § 223 as 
overbroad and violative of the First Amendment,59 § 230 remained. 
Section 230(c), titled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material,” is the immunity provision.60  It is broken 
into two sections:  (1) The “Treatment of Publisher or Speaker” and (2) “Civil 
Liability.”61  Under § 230(c)(1), “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”62  And, 
under § 230(c)(2), no ISP will be liable for good-faith restriction of material 
that may be objectionable, regardless of whether that material is 
constitutionally protected.63 
Section 230(c)(1) and (2), taken together, provide that claims seeking to 
hold an ISP responsible for conduct that would have implicated an offline 
publisher are barred.64  Instead, liability only lies with the “information 
content provider.”  This term, as defined in § 230(f), encompasses anyone 
who creates or develops the information at issue.65  Under this statute, it is 
possible for an ISP to fall under § 230(c) protection as a provider of an 
“interactive computer service,” as well as outside of that same protection as 
a “content provider” or developer of content.66 
The procedural application of § 230(c) is unclear.67  A majority of courts 
consider § 230 immunity prior to discovery, and of those courts, a majority 
never address whether this the proper procedure.68  Some courts, however, 
treat § 230 as an affirmative defense, which allows plaintiffs to plead claims 
without having to address the immunity provision.69  This procedural choice 
 
 58. Robert T. Langdon, Note, The Communications Decency Act § 230:  Make Sense?  Or 
Nonsense?—A Private Person’s Inability to Recover If Defamed in Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 829, 844 (1999). 
 59. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (discussing the unconstitutionality of 
§ 223(a) and (d) and striking them down, with the exception of the portions regarding child 
pornography). 
 60. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 63. Id. § 230(c)(2). 
 64. See id. § 230(c)(1)–(2). 
 65. See id. § 230(f)(3) (defining the term “information content provider” as “any person 
or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service”). 
 66. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 67. See Ardia, supra note 34, at 482–83 (finding there is not consensus in the case law “as 
to whether section 230 can be raised in a motion to dismiss or otherwise addressed before the 
parties have had a chance to engage in discovery”). 
 68. See id. at 483. Ardia notes that, of the 51 percent of cases that consider § 230 prior to 
full discovery, roughly 85 percent do not raise the issue of the proper timing of this defense. 
Id.  Additionally, courts only refused to address the issue of § 230 before discovery in 7.6 
percent of cases. Id.  
 69. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Doe 
v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 230 is an affirmative defense 
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is important as it may determine whether the court permits the case to be 
dismissed in the initial pleading stages on the basis of immunity, whether the 
defendant must answer the complaint, and whether there can be discovery.70  
Certain courts have allowed limited discovery before addressing a motion to 
dismiss,71 but fact patterns are often simple and require little, if any, 
discovery.72 
The procedural use of § 230 may be pivotal in any case that implicates the 
use of machine-learning algorithms in a complaint.  Without access to 
discovery it is almost impossible to determine whether algorithms had an 
effect on specific terrorists’ ability to organize successful attacks because 
information about user accounts is likely proprietary.73  This is where the 
divide from many previous cases is most pronounced:  the nonobvious 
operation of algorithms and the limited access to user data make content 
development difficult to assess and, further down the road, make culpability 
difficult to assign.74 
B.  The Machine-Learning Algorithm Explained 
Before discussing the use of machine-learning algorithms and their effects 
on business, it is helpful to discuss how they differ from conventional 
programming, and the importance of that difference.  In conventional 
programming, programmers create discrete sets of step-by-step instructions 
to be followed by a computer.75  This type of programming was likely 
employed in the initial construction of Facebook’s newsfeed.76  For instance, 
a program might be written to instruct a newsfeed to rank and display recent 
posts from the people a user communicated with most.77  This stands in stark 
 
and that because affirmative defenses cannot justify a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 
the plaintiffs are not required to “plead around” the § 230 defense).  
 70. See Ardia, supra note 34, at 482 (noting that “some courts have refused to permit the 
plaintiff to engage in discovery until the court addressed whether section 230 preempted the 
claims at issue in the case” because of cost considerations). 
 71. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983–84 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (granting the plaintiff the opportunity to conduct limited discovery on issues 
relating to whether the defendant qualified for § 230 immunity). 
 72. See Eric Taubel, Note, The ICS Three-Step:  A Procedural Alternative for Section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act and Derivative Liability in the Online Setting, 12 MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 365, 369 (2011) (noting that the evolution of technology has caused the 
inquiry of § 230 to become an increasingly fact-intensive analysis). 
 73. See PASQUALE, supra note 13, at 3–4 (noting the intentional information imbalance 
where ISPs seek to aggregate all information about users, but divulge none of it to maintain 
power). 
 74. See id.  Pasquale goes on to note that users are left “in the dark” about the “[s]ecret 
algorithmic rules for organizing information, and wars against those who would defeat” or try 
to learn those rules. Id. at 66.  He also points out that users are not technology companies’ 
customers; they are the product sold to advertisers. Id. 
 75. See Tanz, supra note 5. 
 76. See Oremus, supra note 4 (describing the first newsfeed engine as a “crude algorithm” 
based on what engineers believed people might like).  
 77. This is a hypothetical.  Facebook does not share the details of their newsfeed rankings. 
See Caleb Garling, Tricking Facebook’s Algorithm, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/tricking-facebooks-
algorithm/375801/ [https://perma.cc/8ZTS-4UGM]. 
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contrast to machine-learning algorithms, which are defined by their self-
teaching abilities.78 
A machine-learning algorithm ingests information and creates inferences 
in order to categorize and act based on overarching goals defined by 
programmers.79  In traditional programming, mechanisms operate as the 
result of concrete rules; as such, problems are solved by correcting the 
programmers’ previously written rules to yield a different output.80  By 
contrast, if the output of a machine-learning algorithm is unsatisfactory, the 
program needs more exposure to trial and error; it will self-teach to achieve 
its goal.81 
The difficulty with machine-learning programs is that the engineers are no 
longer fully in control.  These programs’ operations are not digestible lines 
of code but rather an indecipherable web of what has been learned, over time, 
to ascertain categorizations.82  There are not rigid rules designating a path to 
the desired destination and so there are no concrete judgments to be 
corrected.83  Outsourcing decision-making processes to technology that has 
no discernable logic may have unknowable consequences on human 
perceptions of self and the world at large.84 
C.  Facebook’s Evolution:  Developing the Science of Engagement 
Facebook engineers work to find the most relevant material for users to 
consume.85  In this effort, their techniques have evolved from rudimentary 
guesses to science-based methods and behavioral testing.86  The mission is 
to create a behavioral-response cycle to a research process that Pavlov would 
envy.87  In the struggle to discern “relevancy score[s]” for posters, the 
development team has expressed a philosophy that centers on the importance 
 
 78. Tanz, supra note 5. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  An excellent hypothetical is excerpted here:   
With machine learning, programmers don’t encode computers with instructions.  
They train them.  If you want to teach a neural network to recognize a cat, for 
instance, you don’t tell it to look for whiskers, ears, fur, and eyes.  You simply show 
it thousands and thousands of photos of cats, and eventually it works things out.  If 
it keeps misclassifying foxes as cats, you don’t rewrite the code.  You just keep 
coaching it. 
Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (“And as these black boxes assume responsibility for more and more of our daily 
digital tasks, they are not only going to change our relationship to technology—they are going 
to change how we think about ourselves, our world, and our place within it.”). 
 85. See Oremus, supra note 4. 
 86. See id.; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra Part I.C.2. 
 87. See Bianca Bosker, The Binge Breaker, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/the-binge-breaker/501122/ 
[https://perma.cc/BW5T-W25U] (arguing that “technology has become better at controlling 
us”). 
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of aggregating the most meaningful experience for each individual:  the one 
that will most influence time spent on the site.88 
This Part briefly outlines the history of Facebook’s platform—specifically 
looking at how and why its algorithms developed—and then explores the 
effects those algorithms have on users.  This analysis aids the later 
consideration of machine-learning algorithms’ relationship to profitability 
and their influence on human decision-making, which will be important when 
assessing whether content is developed and thus ineligible for immunity 
under § 230. 
1.  The Evolution from “Likes” to “Relevancy Scores” 
Facebook began as a directory-type network in 2004.89  The newsfeed—
introduced in 2006 to show users their friends’ updates and photos—was first 
ordered based on the guesswork of engineers.90  In 2007, the “like” button 
was introduced to begin to eliminate the guesswork and to facilitate 
understanding of engagement on the site.91  This innovation was significant 
as it marked the first time Facebook employed an algorithm that was tied to 
user action.92  The “like” button was accompanied by a feature that allowed 
users to delete posts that they did not want to see.93  Both additions allowed 
Facebook to begin to understand user behavior on an individualized basis and 
predict what specific users wanted to see.  Users were now equipped to 
unwittingly improve their engagement with the site by telling Facebook 
precisely what they found interesting.94 
In 2009, an update to the algorithm prioritized posts not only based on 
user’s previous interests but also on a post’s ability to gain “likes.”95  
However, in 2013, Facebook realized that users “like” things that they don’t 
necessary engage with so that newsfeeds were filling with posts that were 
more reactionary than engaging.96  Continuing to use such a crude metric 
would undoubtedly stilt engagement.97  To combat this, Facebook utilized 
 
 88. See Oremus, supra note 4. 
 89. Facebook Newsfeed Algorithm History, WALLAROO (Aug. 17, 2017), 
http://wallaroomedia.com/facebook-newsfeed-algorithm-change-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z8QN-DC74]. 
 90. See Oremus, supra note 4. 
 91. See Facebook Newsfeed Algorithm History, supra note 89. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Oremus, supra note 4 (“That users didn’t realize they were doing this was perhaps 
the most ingenious part. . . .  Facebook’s news feed algorithm was one of the first to 
surreptitiously enlist users in personalizing their experience—and influencing everyone 
else’s.”). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. (“Publishers, advertisers, hoaxsters, and even individual users began to glean the 
elements that viral posts tended to have in common—the features that seemed to trigger 
reflexive likes . . . .  Social-media consultants sprung up to advise people on how to game 
Facebook’s algorithm:  the right words to use, the right time to post, the right blend of words 
and pictures. ‘LIKE THIS,’ a feel-good post would implore, and people would do it, even if 
they didn’t really care that much about the post.”). 
 97. See id. 
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metrics like time spent on the page, the relative amount of time users spent 
on some posts over others, and whether someone had “liked” the post before 
or after engaging with it.98  This structure even logs user behaviors that are 
not direct interactions with the site in order to learn what constitutes more 
engaging material for individual users.99 
As the data flowed in, Facebook was able to better predict and distill its 
users’ content desires.  The rise of machine-learning algorithms, driven by 
historic behavioral data, has made it apparent that companies can “use code 
to understand our most intimate ties.”100  Facebook’s founder and CEO Mark 
Zuckerburg has suggested that there might be a “fundamental mathematical 
law underlying human relationships that governs the balance of who and 
what we all care about.”101 
The intense focus on the development of technology that better 
understands the mathematics of human relationships is driven primarily by 
the byproduct:  money.  For many online businesses, revenue comes 
primarily from advertising.102  Advertisers pay more for ad space on websites 
where users spend more time, exposing the user to the ad for a longer period.  
This pricing structure has created an “attention economy,” in which 
companies are incentivized to hold users’ attention to increase ad revenue.103  
This business model has enabled a “race to the bottom of the brain stem.”104  
Facebook is no exception to this rule; their science is driven and funded by a 
need to increase revenues.105 
When user-generated data become the basis for revenue, those data 
become necessary for the continuing success of the business.106  Under a 
§  230 analysis, this information becomes relevant to the assessment of the 
level of development that the content has undergone in service of the ISP’s 
ends.  Courts have considered whether a defendant has a vested interest in 
the collection of information when determining whether the actions of the 
ISP fall outside the boundaries of publisher actions.107 
 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Tanz, supra note 5. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Lev Grossman, The Great Ad-Blocker Battle, TIME (Oct. 8, 2015) 
http://time.com/4065962/our-attention-is-just-a-pawn-in-the-great-game-of-silicon-valley/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20151012050137/http://time.com:80/4065962/our-attention-is-
just-a-pawn-in-the-great-game-of-silicon-valley/]; see also supra note 74. 
 103. Bosker, supra note 87 (comparing the tech industry to “Big Tobacco before the link 
between cigarettes and cancer was established” because the industry is “keen to give customers 
more of what they want, yet simultaneously inflicting collateral damage on their lives”). 
 104. Id.  
 105. See Jane Wakefield, What Is Facebook Doing with My Data?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34776191 [https://perma.cc/8TX8-WTB7] 
(“Advertising revenue is Facebook’s biggest source of income, jumping 45 percent this 
year.”). 
 106. See PASQUALE, supra note 13, at 66; supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“Roommate both elicits the allegedly illegal content and 
makes aggressive use of it in conducting its business.”); see also id. at 1166 (“Roommate 
makes answering the discriminatory questions a condition of doing business.”). 
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2.  Facebook’s Demonstrable Effects on Behavior 
Facebook’s interactive experience represents much more than the bulletin 
board in Stratton.108  Facebook’s use of algorithms has tangible effects on its 
bottom line and intangible effects on its users.  The same algorithms that are 
focused on increasing time spent on the site can influence users in ways that 
go beyond creating bad time-management habits.  In two separate studies, 
Facebook demonstrated its actual power to control users.  One study 
(the “mood study”) shows how, by adjusting the tone of messages on users’ 
newsfeeds, Facebook can make a certain type of response more likely.109  
The second study (the “voting study”) shows that, by feeding people 
messages related to voting, Facebook enticed 340,000 additional voters to go 
to the polls.110 
The mood study was conducted in January 2012.111  For one week, 
newsfeeds of almost 700,000 people were adjusted to show happier-than-
average posts or sadder-than-average posts in an effort to see if the messages 
sparked any type of response.112  They did.113  Users began posting messages 
corresponding to the mood they had been primed with.114  This study was 
controversial because it was conducted without the express consent of the 
people involved.115 
The mood study’s express purpose was to make Facebook users’ content 
“as relevant and engaging as possible.”116  The engineers were testing 
whether overexposure to negativity on users’ newsfeeds would lead to 
avoidance of the platform.117  Presumably, Facebook now knows the extent 
of the influence of its algorithms and has used that knowledge to manage 
users’ feeds. 
The voting study went further.  This study demonstrated the link between 
online and offline behaviors.118  In the study, Facebook pushed generic 
 
 108. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at 
*6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 109. See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 8788 (showing “that emotional states can be 
transferred to others via emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same emotions 
without their awareness” and without direct interaction between people). 
 110. See Corbyn, supra note 1. 
 111. Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 8789. 
 112. Id. at 8788–89. 
 113. Id. at 8789. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Robinson Meyer, Everything We Know About Facebook’s Secret Mood Manipulation 
Experiment, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-secret-mood-manipulation-
experiment/373648/ [https://perma.cc/V945-75Q6] (noting that there was no legal recourse as 
language in the terms of service suggested this possibility). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Gail Sullivan, Facebook Responds to Criticism of Its Experiment on Users, WASH. 
POST (June 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/30/ 
facebook-responds-to-criticism-of-study-that-manipulated-users-news-feeds/ 
[https://perma.cc/G7ZP-2VJY]. 
 118. Rogers, supra note 1 (“In their paper, Epstein and Robertson equate digital 
gerrymandering to what a political operative might call GOTV—Get Out the Vote, the 
mobilization of activated supporters.  It’s a standard campaign move when your base agrees 
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messages to sixty-one million users extolling them to vote.119  For certain 
users, the message was augmented with notifications that other people in their 
network had already voted.120  Facebook calculated that by the end of the 
2010 congressional election, it had influenced an additional 340,000 people 
to go to their polling places.121 
Although no court has yet been faced with evaluating the specific level of 
influence created by Facebook’s algorithms, when assessing whether the 
defendant is a codeveloper of content the court will look to the extent to 
which users are restricted when generating and reviewing their own content 
and the content of others.122  To the extent that user content or actions can be 
directly linked to what users have seen, data collected by Facebook to display 
the consumed content plausibly played a role in users’ overall decision-
making.123 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF § 230 IMMUNITY 
This Part outlines the judicial interpretation of § 230.  Part II.A begins with 
a discussion of Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,124 the first court of appeals 
case interpreting § 230.  Using § 230’s policy goals as a guide, Zeran 
established the broad construction of the statute and created the three-prong 
test used to determine whether § 230 immunity applies.125  Next, Part II.B 
traces Zeran’s impact on later courts’ broad construction of immunity and 
notes logical difficulties that occur when the statute is stretched beyond its 
limit.  Part II.C then outlines the backlash to broad immunity sparked by Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com 
(“Roommates”)126 and discusses the impact of that case on the analysis of 
ISP’s as developers, rather than creators, of content.  Part II.D concludes with 
an overview of the effects of Roommates on § 230 doctrine. 
Since its debut in the Fourth Circuit in 1997,127 § 230 immunity has been 
a powerful tool for ISP defendants.  Although legislative history suggests that 
immunity was intended to apply to third-party publishers accused of 
 
with your positions but isn’t highly motivated—because they feel disenfranchised, let’s say, 
or have problems getting to polling places.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Corbyn, supra note 1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 123. See Tom Simonite, What Facebook Knows, MIT TECH. REV. (June 13, 2012), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/428150/what-facebook-knows/ 
[https://perma.cc/UW2R-3CFK] (discussing a study that found that “our close friends strongly 
sway which information we share, but overall their impact is dwarfed by the collective 
influence of numerous more distant contacts—what sociologists call ‘weak ties’”). 
 124. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 125. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2012); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (holding that the 
policies and findings of Congress require a broad reading of immunity). 
 126. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 127. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327. 
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defamation, as in Stratton,128 the Fourth Circuit interpreted immunity to bar 
all tort-based liability.129  In the spirit of broad immunity, subsequent courts 
have construed “creation or development” in the statute narrowly, meaning 
an ISP’s conduct is likely to be characterized as “publisher” conduct and 
receive immunity as opposed to conduct being considered codevelopment of 
content.130  However, rebellions against this broad judicial construction have 
been cropping up since 2004.131  Courts have intermittently broadened what 
it means to “develop” information and narrowed what can be considered 
“traditional publishing activities,” which creates caveats in this once-
immutable doctrine. 
A.  Establishing Expansive Immunity:  Zeran 
Zeran marks the first instance of § 230’s judicial interpretation.132  The 
Zeran court handed down pivotal holdings that influenced the scope of 
immunity moving forward.  The first was the court’s determination that the 
word “publisher” in the statute would take on its plain meaning, as opposed 
to the legal meaning in defamation law.133  A website qualified as a 
“publisher” when it undertook any type of publication-related activity, such 
as posting another’s content or making small grammatical edits.134  The court 
also noted that, regardless of the provision’s origins in defamation law, § 230 
provided general immunity to all theories of liability.135  These two 
interpretations, which were by no means required,136 set the tone for courts 
to apply a broad construction of § 230 and expand immunity in other ways. 
In Zeran, an anonymous user of an AOL bulletin board, purporting to be 
Kenneth Zeran, offered T-shirts for sale with slogans praising the Oklahoma 
City bombings.137  The user also included Zeran’s personal contact 
information.138  As a result, Zeran received death threats and hate mail for 
the ensuing month.139  Zeran contacted AOL on numerous occasions and 
 
 128. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 129. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (noting that immunity applies “to any cause of action” that 
seeks to impose liability on ISPs for information originating with users). 
 130. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that AOL 
was not the creator or developer of defamatory content, despite the editorial control they had 
over editorialist Matt Drudge’s gossip website and the licensing agreement they had with 
Drudge to produce content).   
 131. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 167 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that 
“section 230 does not restrict distributor liability under the common law”), rev’d, 146 P.3d 
510 (Cal. 2006). 
 132. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327. 
 133. See Lukmire, supra note 56, at 397. (“After Zeran, courts expanded the reach of 
section 230 immunity beyond defamation law not by construing the term ‘publisher’ in 
subsection (c)(1) as a term of art, but instead using it as it appears in ordinary parlance.”). 
 134. See id. at 390–91. 
 135. See Zeran, 129 F.3d. at 330. 
 136. See Lukmire, supra note 56, at 384. 
 137. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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asked the company to remove the posts and post a redaction, but AOL’s 
attempted removal was ineffective, and it refused to post a redaction.140 
Zeran then sued AOL and claimed that AOL’s behavior was negligent 
under a “distributor” liability scheme141 and that, as such, AOL was ineligible 
to claim § 230 immunity, which applied only to publishers of information.142  
The Fourth Circuit explained that a narrow interpretation of “publisher” was 
out of line with Congress’s stated policy goals and concluded that a broad 
construction was warranted.143  Accordingly, the court had properly found 
that distributor liability was a subsection of publisher liability.144 
Even though the Fourth Circuit was only presented with the issue of 
whether § 230 granted immunity for negligence as well as defamation, the 
court indicated that § 230 could protect defendants from any cause of action 
that treated it as the “publisher or speaker” of information provided by a 
user.145  This maneuver—untethering § 230 from defamation (and possibly 
from torts altogether)146—influenced almost every ensuing judicial 
consideration.147  This holding created a no-holds-barred immunity under 
which some courts claim there are only two areas of law exempt from § 230’s 
protection:  intellectual property law and federal criminal law.148 
B.  The Norm of Expansion of Immunity:  Zeran’s Legacy 
Zeran’s influence on § 230 jurisprudence manifests in two ways.  
Subsequent courts have used it to support a strong presumption in favor of 
immunity and applied the test from Zeran to evaluate eligibility for 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Publishers can be held liable without proof of specific knowledge of the defamatory 
statement’s existence in the work, but to find a distributor’s conduct tortious, the minimum 
requirement is actual knowledge of the defamatory statements.  See id. at 330–31. 
 142. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012) (“No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”).  
 143. Zeran, 129 F.3d. at 330 (stating that the purpose of the act was to “preserve the vibrant 
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)). 
 144. Id. at 332 (finding that distributor and publisher were separate tiers of liability under 
the same cause of action—“publication” (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (5th ed. 1984))). 
 145. Id. at 330. 
 146. Id. (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action 
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of 
that service.” (emphasis added)). 
 147. See Lukmire, supra note 56, at 384 (noting that Zeran has been cited in almost every 
decision regarding § 230 immunity and arguing that this initial interpretation was too 
expansive and set dangerous precedent with its generous construction).   
 148. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1187 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting that these are the only 
exemptions explicit in the statute under § 230(e)).  There have been courts that refuse to let 
states prosecute purveyors of child pornography and hold that ISP prosecution is prohibited 
under § 230. See, e.g., Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1275 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012) (granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a state anti-child-
pornography law where the plaintiffs speech would be improperly restricted and their 
argument would likely succeed on the merits due to the supremacy of the federal statute). 
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immunity.  As such, courts continue to presume that immunity applies as new 
and different technology comes before them, while using a test originally 
created in 1996 for online bulletin boards. 
The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of § 230 encouraged further expansion.  
Courts have stretched Zeran’s broad constructions—the definition of 
“traditional”-publisher conduct and the scope of protection—to their logical 
extremes.  Types of ISPs considered publishers (as opposed to “content 
providers”) for § 230 purposes include email listservs,149 dating websites,150 
social networking sites,151 and gossip sites.152  Similarly, causes of action 
barred from adjudication by § 230 include defamation,153 negligence,154 Fair 
Housing Act (FHA) claims,155 and even state criminal charges.156  
Furthermore, in the spirit of expanding the immunity to its broadest point, 
post-Zeran courts have explicitly narrowed the definition of creation or 
development of content, resulting in few, if any, actions that fall outside the 
scope of publisher conduct and into the role of codeveloper of information.157  
As such, the judiciary has contributed to the iron-clad immunity ISPs enjoy 
today in an analytical and normative manner. 
First, even without the addition of courts’ narrow construction of 
development, the Zeran construction creates almost impenetrable immunity.  
The question of whether the cause of action permits the consideration of 
§ 230 immunity is almost always answered in favor of the defendant.158  
Courts grant immunity for claims in which the defendant took on the role of 
a “traditional” publisher when editing the content, but the definition of 
“traditional” publisher is not derived from the statute or common law.159  It 
 
 149. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 150. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 151. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846, 849–50 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 
528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 152. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 153. See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 154. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 155. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 156. Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1275 (W.D. Wash. 2012) 
(holding that an injunction against enforcement of a criminal statute prosecuting pages that 
hosted ads depicting child pornography was proper where the immunity provision and First 
Amendment rights both indicated that the Plaintiff would likely prevail when criminal charges 
were brought). 
 157. See Recent Case, FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., No. 06-CV-105, 2007 WL 4356786 (D. 
Wyo. Sept. 28, 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 2246, 2246 n.3 (2008) (noting that the courts have 
utilized three “broad interpretative policy levers” to control immunity:  the first two, as noted 
in Zeran, are the broad construction of “internet service providers” and the allowance of any 
cause of action, and the third is the judicial license to determine what encompasses the 
definition of creation and development narrowly). 
 158. See Ardia, supra note 34, at 477. 
 159. See supra note 133 (noting that “publisher” is a term of art); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d 
at 330 (noting that the “exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions” include 
“deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content”); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 
992 F. Supp. 44, 49–53 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that defendant was not a content provider 
despite its exercising editorial control over a gossip column’s content and having a licensing 
agreement employing the author). 
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has been crafted by the courts.160  Ultimately, an expansive interpretation of 
the claims covered by § 230 (in which harmful third-party content is not the 
basis of the legal claim), combined with an expansive definition of 
traditional-publisher activities defined by the court stretches immunity to its 
broadest point.  Courts have even found that immunity applies where the 
claim brought is unrelated to the specific content posted by a third party.161 
This expansive interpretation was employed in Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,162 
where the court found that a publisher could not be held liable for any action 
in which a third party played a part, thus separating the doctrine from the 
realm of content publication altogether.163  In Doe, a mother sued on behalf 
of her underage daughter who had been sexually assaulted by a man she 
connected with on MySpace.164  She asserted that she was not suing about 
the content on the platform but rather for MySpace’s failure to warn that this 
type of assault could happen as a result of joining the website.165  The court 
held that even where the plaintiff alleged harm on grounds other than the 
posting of content, § 230 “precludes courts from entertaining claims that 
would place a [website] in a publisher’s role.”166  This construction absolves 
ISPs of liability even where the content the third party posted is not related 
to the harm alleged.  Instead, the ability to allege a failure-to-warn claim—
implicating ISPs acting as a business rather than a publisher—is destroyed.167 
In addition to continuing to apply Zeran’s broad interpretation of publisher 
duties, courts have narrowed the definition of creation or development, which 
results in a defendant-friendly immunity.168  Courts’ narrow interpretation of 
 
 160. See supra note 133. 
 161. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 
413 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 162. 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 163. See Lukmire, supra note 56, at 398 (noting that the immunity “even extended . . . to 
cover MySpace’s own failure to act” without respect to the content exchanged on the website).  
But see Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that immunity 
did not apply to a website that models used to advertise their freelance services where 
information on the site was used by two men to lure models to Florida to rape them).  In 
Internet Brands, the court allowed the failure to warn claim to proceed because the duty to 
warn did not derive from the company’s actions as a publisher (editing or removing content) 
but from its failure as a service to warn of attendant threats of the service unrelated to posted 
content. Id. at 851.  This opinion continues the trend of using precision when defining 
publisher conduct as compared to ISP conduct.  The court in Internet Brands, however, further 
distinguished MySpace by the fact that Internet Brands had actual knowledge of the scheme. 
Id. at 853.   
 164. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 848. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 847 (quoting Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (E.D. Pa. 2006)); see also 
Lukmire, supra note 56, at 398 (discussing how even though this ruling brought the statute “to 
its breaking point, the court accused the plaintiff of disingenuous ‘artful pleading’ for accusing 
MySpace of negligence”). 
 167. See Lukmire, supra note 56, at 398. 
 168. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
“development” of content “means something more substantial than merely editing . . . and 
selecting material”); see also Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 
980, 985–86 (10th Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. 1998); 
Paul Ehrlich, Note, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 401, 406–
11 (2002) (analyzing the expansive approach courts have taken regarding immunity).  
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development reinforces the broad interpretation of what a “traditional” 
publisher does:  the more broadly the court construes a publisher’s actions, 
the smaller the window becomes for a publisher to develop content.  In 
addition to granting immunity for actions that are “traditionally” those of a 
publisher,169 courts have expanded the definition of publisher duties to 
include employing content providers.170  This appears to conflate the duties 
of publishers with general duties of ISPs. 
In Blumenthal v. Drudge,171 AOL was sued for defamatory remarks 
originating with a column it published to its readers.172  The allegedly 
defamatory remarks were authored by Matt Drudge, a paid writer of a gossip 
column for AOL over which AOL had editorial control.173  The court held 
that § 230 applied because the story was written by Drudge without 
substantive edits made by AOL.174  This case demonstrated that, despite 
soliciting and paying for the content under the specific pretense of gossip, the 
ISP could still escape liability.  This holding did not address that § 230 was 
enacted to encourage “Good Samaritan” blocking175 by shielding from 
liability those websites that attempted to edit lewd, defamatory, or obscene 
material.176  This purpose becomes obstructed where ISPs are not responsible 
for content that they have solicited via licensing agreements with columnists. 
Finally, as apparent in Blumenthal, neither the tone nor the purpose of a 
website influences the analysis of development under § 230 immunity.  Even 
those who encourage gossip,177 derogatory claims,178 and facilitate child 
prostitution179 are not liable where the courts consider the invitation to 
criminal or tortious acts within the bounds of the publishers’ role.  Thus, by 
broadening the role of the traditional publisher to include a broad range of 
actions, courts have created a smaller pool of activity that falls outside the 
role of a traditional publisher.  By making that window smaller, courts have 
all but guaranteed immunity, regardless of ISP conduct. 
 
 169. See supra note 159. 
 170. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 50. 
 171. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 172. Id. at 46. 
 173. Id. at 47, 50. 
 174. Id. at 50. 
 175. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). 
 176. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the title is “hardly an apt description if its principal 
effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials 
via their services”); see also Part I.A.2. 
 177. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51. 
 178. See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407–08 (6th Cir. 
2014); see also Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. 
Ariz. 2008) (noting that while it was “obvious that a website entitled Ripoff Report encourages 
the publication of defamatory content,” ultimately § 230 provides immunity where Ripoff 
Report did not create or develop the offending content). 
 179. See Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1275 (W.D. Wash. 
2012); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 
2006). 
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Other than the three levels of broad construction,180 the most explicit 
remnant of Zeran is the formal analysis courts apply to determine the 
applicability of § 230.  This test requires the consideration of three questions:  
(1) whether the defendant qualifies as a provider of an “interactive computer 
service,”181 (2) whether the asserted claims treat the defendant as a publisher 
or speaker of the information, and (3) whether the content was wholly 
provided by another “information content provider.”182  Though most early 
decisions accepted the Zeran construction, dissension was apparent as early 
as 2004.183  As the internet began to flourish and the largest companies 
became technology based, the attitude of “internet exceptionalism” began to 
shift:  the broadest possible construction was no longer the only option 
considered.184 
C.  Curtailing Broad Immunity:  Roommates Assesses Content 
at Issue and Redefines “Development” 
Although broad construction of § 230 immunity dominated early opinions, 
judicial opposition to sweeping immunity was apparent within the first ten 
years of its application.185  Judges demonstrated discontent with the position 
of legal privilege that internet businesses gained over every other business.186  
The fact that companies with an online presence could advance illegal 
conduct with virtually no threat of ensuing civil litigation grates against 
certain judges’ sense of justice.187  In a departure from a period of total 
 
 180. The applicability of § 230 to any cause of action, the broad construction of the duties 
of a traditional publisher, and the narrow construction of “development” are the three 
interpretations that have expanded the applicability of § 230 immunity. See supra Part II.A–
B. 
 181. This inquiry requires very little of the court.  It merely asks whether the defendant 
operates a web-based service. 
 182. James D. Shanahan, Rethinking the Communications Decency Act:  Eliminating 
Statutory Protections of Discriminatory Housing Advertisements on the Internet, 60 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 135, 139 (2007); see, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (“Separated into its elements, subsection (c)(1) precludes liability for ‘(1) a provider 
or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law 
cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information 
content provider.’” (quoting Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009))). 
 183. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 167 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that 
“section 230 does not restrict distributor liability under the common law”), rev’d, 146 P.3d 
510 (Cal. 2006) (reversing in favor of the Zeran analysis in part because of the practical 
implications of forum shopping). 
 184. See Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, TECH. & MARKETING 
L. BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/the_third_wave.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HUR3-CZNJ]. 
 185. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (critiquing the drafting of the statute but ultimately holding that 
the most sensible construction provides immunity for Craigslist from the Fair Housing Act 
claims); see also supra note 183. 
 186. See supra note 185; see also Joey Ou, Note, The Overexpansion of the 
Communications Decency Act Safe Harbor, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 455, 470 (2013). 
 187. See supra notes 185–86; see also Christopher Zara, The Most Important Law in Tech 
Has a Problem, WIRED (Jan. 3, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/the-most-
important-law-in-tech-has-a-problem/ [https://perma.cc/HP63-KGPZ] (noting “a disquieting 
number of courtroom losses for Section 230” in the past year). 
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deference to § 230’s immunity, some courts have found that, depending on 
the claim brought, a website’s structure may bar it from immunity.188  But 
courts struggle to delineate precisely where this disqualification occurs.  At 
what point does an ISP’s involvement with the content move it from the role 
of publisher to the role of “developer” under this more attentive regime? 
The first case to put substantive limits on what constitutes the publisher’s 
role and analyze what qualifies as codevelopment of information is 
Roommates.189  Part 1 describes the holding in that case and then dissects the 
analytical considerations that characterized the decision.  It then discusses 
the logical difficulties that are presented by the final statement of the rule.  
Next, Part 2 parses the opinion’s analysis of the statute and the facts, while 
specifically limiting references to “underlying illegality” to avoid the 
jurisprudential difficulties it creates.  Finally, Part 3 addresses the difficulties 
of considering illegality in § 230 analysis and why an abandonment of the 
“underlying illegality” standard will enable courts to approach the issue of 
immunity more fairly. 
1.  Roommates:  The Holding 
Roommate.com, LLC operated a site, Roommates.com,190 which allowed 
users to find prospective roommates and shared living spaces.191  When users 
set up profiles, they were required to fill out profiles with prepopulated drop-
down menus and selection boxes as well as “additional comments” boxes.192  
Answers to questions regarding the residence location, description, and 
details, as well as to questions about the renter’s sex, sexual orientation, and 
familial status were required.193  Other questions regarding preferences, as 
well as an “additional comments” box, were optional.194  Users could then 
filter options and opt in to receive emails through Roommates.com using 
these criteria.195 
The Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley (FHC) brought suit 
alleging that Roommates.com violated the FHA.  The FHA specifically 
prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin.”196  The FHC alleged that the 
Roommates.com platform violated the FHA first by posting illegal questions 
on its website; second, by forcing users to complete them and by using the 
information provided to send emails with profiles that reflect selected 
 
 188. For a discussion of the limitation of immunity, see infra Part II.C.2, 4. 
 189. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 190. When referring to the 2008 Ninth Circuit en banc decision, this Note uses 
“Roommates” as a short form.  This Note uses “Roommates.com” when referring to the ISP 
and its services. 
 191. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1161. 
 192. Id. at 1165. 
 193. Id. at 1161. 
 194. Id. at 1181 (McKeown, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. 
 196. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012) (making it unlawful to “make, print, or publish” 
discriminatory statements or advertisements related to the sale or rental of a dwelling). 
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preferences; and third, by posting the information in additional comments 
boxes even where the comments were discriminatory.197  Roommates.com 
claimed that § 230 shielded it from liability for FHA violations where third 
parties were the ones using these categories to find housing.  The question 
before the court was directed to the third prong of the Zeran analysis:  
whether Roommates.com was “responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of [the] information.”198  The court held: 
By requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condition of 
accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of pre-populated 
answers, Roommate becomes much more than a passive transmitter of 
information provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, 
of that information.  And section 230 provides immunity only if the 
interactive computer service does not “creat[e] or develop[]” the 
information “in whole or in part.”199 
Under this ruling, Roommates.com lost immunity for the questions it 
posed, for the resulting profiles and emails it assembled using the information 
gathered, and for the search engine it provided that limited results based on 
that information.200  However, Roommates.com did retain immunity for the 
“additional comments” boxes.201 
The holding above, which stripped Roommates.com of most immunity, 
was subsequently clouded by other parts of the opinion.  The court stated 
whether an ISP had “developed” content is contingent on whether the 
unlawful conduct is being furthered by the site’s actions or design.202  Under 
this definition, a court would be required to make a judgment on the merits 
of the claim before deciding whether immunity exists to bar liability.203 
This created a legal regime in which unlawfulness is relitigated over 
multiple proceedings.  For example, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit stripped 
Roommates.com of immunity because its actions contributed to the 
underlying FHA violation.  In 2012, however, when the case reappeared in 
the Ninth Circuit on the merits of the FHA claim, the court determined that 
 
 197. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 
926 (9th Cir. 2007), modified on reh’g en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 198. Id. (alteration in original). 
 199. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1166 (alterations in original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)). 
 200. Id.  
 201. See id. at 1173–74 (holding that because Roommates.com was not responsible “for 
the development” of content within the box because it did “not provide any specific guidance 
as to what the essay should contain, nor [did] it urge subscribers to input discriminatory 
preferences”).  This holding mimicked the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Craigslist. See 
Chicago Lawyers’ Commission for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 
666 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 202. See generally Jeffrey R. Doty, Note, Inducement or Solicitation?  Competing 
Interpretations of the “Underlying Illegality” Test in the Wake of Roommates.com, 6 WASH. 
J.L. TECH. & ARTS 125 (2010); see also Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1168. 
 203. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1182 (McKeown, J., dissenting); see also Eric Goldman, 
Roommates.com Isn’t Dealing in Illegal Content, Even Though the Ninth Circuit Denied 
Section 230 Immunity Because It Was, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/02/roommatescom_is.htm 
[https://perma.cc/AES6-FEM8]. 
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Roommates.com’s actions did not violate the FHA.204  Under a test that 
considers underlying illegality, immunity should have been granted in 2008 
because in 2012, when the issue was litigated, the court found no underlying 
illegality.205 
2.  Roommates Analysis:  Assessing “Development,” 
and the ISP Collection and Use of User-Generated Data 
Roommates served as a useful catalyst for other courts to reexamine the 
third prong of the Zeran analysis—the question of creation or codevelopment 
of content.  While the first issue that Roommates discusses is whether the 
claim treats the defendant as a publisher, the court promptly qualifies that the 
question is only dispositive where the defendant is not also found to be the 
creator or developer of the content at issue.206  As such, the Roommates 
analysis hinges directly on the third prong of the Zeran analysis. 
In its analysis of the third prong, the Ninth Circuit first identified the 
specific content at issue for each cause of action and discerned the 
relationship of that content to the ISP’s conduct.  This analysis created a 
novel bright line between conduct as “creation” and conduct as 
“development.”207  Importantly, if the content at issue is a direct result of the 
conduct of the ISP, then the content is considered “created” by the ISP and 
immunity does not apply.  If the ISP is alleged to have “developed” the 
information, the court must consider whether the ISP’s control in soliciting 
and utilizing user data constituted development.208 
a.  ISP as Creator of Content 
The Ninth Circuit began its immunity analysis with the simplest issue:  
whether immunity applies to the questions and prepopulated answers created 
by Roommates.com where that content allegedly indicates intent to 
discriminate in violation of the FHA.209  The court reasoned that since 
Roommates.com created the questions and the selectable answers and since 
these questions were alleged to be a direct violation of the FHA (choosing 
housing based on designated attributes), Roommates.com created the content 
at issue.210  Section 230 immunity was denied as it could not protect content 
that Roommates.com had actually created.  While this reading comports with 
the statute, in order to hold that immunity did not apply, the court had to 
narrow an earlier Ninth Circuit ruling on § 230 immunity. 
 
 204. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 
1223 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 205. Id.; see also Goldman, supra note 203. 
 206. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162 (majority opinion). 
 207. Id. at 1167–69, 1172. 
 208. Id. at 1172. 
 209. See id. at 1164 (“Councils allege that requiring subscribers to disclose their sex, family 
status and sexual orientation ‘indicates’ an intent to discriminate against them, and thus runs 
afoul of both the FHA and state law.”). 
 210. Id. 
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That earlier decision, Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,211 involved a 
fake dating profile that was created using the images of the plaintiff.212  The 
profile also contained sexually suggestive language and made her personal 
contact information and address available.213  The disclosure of this type of 
personal information was not required for the service.214  Carafano sued for 
invasion of privacy, misappropriation of the right of publicity, defamation, 
and negligence.215  The court had held that the ISP was not liable under the 
CDA because “no profile has any content until a user actively creates it.”216 
The court in Roommates expressly narrowed this holding, which otherwise 
would have included the Roommates.com profiles.217  The court noted that 
even though both cases involved questions and prepopulated answers, the 
harm in Carafano had not derived from the questions; as such, the questions 
were not the content at issue in that case.  Instead, the harm was entirely the 
product of the third party’s posting of private contact information, leading to 
privacy invasions, and the posting of false answers, leading to defamation.218  
Nothing on the Metrosplash platform encouraged or solicited personal 
information from individuals or information that could defame, because the 
user was supposedly creating his or her own profile.219  The claim against 
Metrosplash was that it failed to review every profile for potentially 
defamatory content or personal information.220  This claim had nothing to do 
with the actual profile created.  The content at issue was defamatory material.  
Nothing alleged related to how the development of a profile would lead to 
the defamation or how the questions solicited an invasion of privacy.  By 
contrast, Roommates.com asked and provided limited answers for the 
questions that formed the basis of the intent to discriminate required to state 
a claim under the FHA. 
b.  ISP as Codeveloper 
In Roommates, the FHC alleged that Roommates.com developed content 
that violated the FHA:  specifically, the completed profiles and emails that 
 
 211. 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 212. Id. at 1121. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1122. 
 216. Id. at 1124. 
 217. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (calling the holding in Carafano “unduly broad”). 
 218. In this analysis, the court also stressed that the conduct contributed to the illegality of 
the content, whereas in Carafano, it did not.  However, the questions posed by 
Roommates.com did not violate the FHA. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 219. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 
928 (9th Cir. 2007), modified on reh’g en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The website 
sought information about the individual posting the information, not about unwitting third 
parties.  Nothing in the questions the dating service asked suggested, encouraged or solicited 
posting the profile of another person . . . .”). 
 220. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1171–72 (“With respect to the defamatory content, the 
website operator was merely a passive conduit and thus could not be held liable for failing to 
detect and remove it.”). 
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enabled users to search for roommates using sensitive characteristics.221  To 
assess this claim, the Ninth Circuit redefined “development” and used its 
definition to analyze the relationship between the ISP and the user-generated 
content.222  Ultimately, the court found that the restricted options available 
to users and the importance of the collected data to the profitability of the ISP 
were two factors that differentiated the survey-enabled services (search and 
email functions) from the additional comment box services that retained 
immunity.223 
The Ninth Circuit faced an uphill battle to redefine ISP conduct as 
“development” given the acceptance of most ISP conduct as “traditional 
publisher” conduct.224  However, using close textual analysis, the court 
demonstrated that there was necessarily room for its interpretation of the 
word “development.”225  This allowed the court to move away from the 
proimmunity “traditional publisher” norm.226  While it initially conceded that 
the broadest definition of development would eviscerate immunity by 
encompassing almost all functions of websites and search engines, it 
demonstrated that the dissent’s narrow definition effectively ignored the 
word “development” and only permitted immunity to be withheld from 
content-creator ISPs.227  The court ultimately likened development to the 
solicitation and use of information.228 
The court established that an ISP could be a developer of content and, as 
such, analyzed Roommates.com’s solicitation and use of content despite the 
fact that the content was user generated.229  Under the solicitation analysis, 
the court found that where the type of information collected was dictated so 
strictly by the manner in which it was collected, it was deemed to be 
codeveloped by the ISP.230  This occurred where the information was both 
required and limited to prepopulated options.  The required disclosure of 
information and the limitation of survey answers are the most easily 
discernable differences between the survey-based services, which lost 
immunity, and the “additional comments” box, which did not.231  Because 
Roommates.com required answers from prepopulated selections as 
conditions of using the service, Roommates.com was deemed a 
 
 221. Id. at 1167. 
 222. Id. at 1166–68. 
 223. Id. at 1172. 
 224. See supra Part II.B. 
 225. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167. 
 226. For a discussion of the evolution of § 230 doctrine, see supra Part II.A–B. 
 227. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167 (“[R]eading the exception for co-developers as applying 
only to content that originates entirely with the website—as the dissent would seem to 
suggest—ignores the words ‘development . . . in part’ in the statutory passage ‘creation or 
development in whole or in part.’  We believe that both the immunity for passive conduits and 
the exception for co-developers must be given their proper scope . . . .” (citation omitted) 
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012))). 
 228. Id. at 1166 (using the terms “development” and “solicitation” synonymously by saying 
“solicit (a.k.a. ‘develop’)”). 
 229. Id. at 1169. 
 230. Id. at 1172. 
 231. See supra note 201 (describing the upholding of immunity for the “additional 
comments” box). 
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codeveloper.232  The ISP’s limitation of “user control” discussed in the 
statute233 could be a reason for the court’s hostility toward the format that 
Roommates.com presented to users.234 
The specific organization of the information, and the inability for users to 
control that information as a contingency of using the service, caused the 
court to find that Roommates.com did not qualify for immunity.235  Some 
commenters have proposed guidelines to assess whether restriction goes so 
far as to limit the user to the role of codeveloper of the information.236  Such 
guidelines consider the number of choices available to the user and whether 
the user has the ability to abstain from the collaboration altogether.237 
When analyzing the ISP’s use of the user-generated content, the court also 
considered the extent to which the collection of the required content enabled 
the ISP to meet business objectives.238  The court undertook this analysis 
when assessing the survey-based services offered.  It noted that 
Roommates.com’s email- and platform-filtration capabilities were enabled 
by the manner in which the information was collected.239  This filtration also 
furthered the alleged conduct by allowing the potential for discriminatory 
conduct.240  It distinguishes “merely” publishing the profiles to other users 
from Roommates.com’s channeling of profiles based on users’ preferences 
and the exclusion of profiles that do not fit those preferences.241  The court 
 
 232. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167 (“If Roommate has no immunity for asking the 
discriminatory questions, as we concluded above, . . . it can certainly have no immunity for 
using the answers to the unlawful questions to limit who has access to housing.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 233. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (2012) (stating that it is the policy of the United States to 
“encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other 
interactive computer services.” (emphasis added)). 
 234. Hattie Harman, Note, Drop-Down Lists and the Communications Decency Act:  A 
Creation Conundrum, 43 IND. L. REV. 143, 163–64 (2009) (noting that where there is free will, 
one can encourage a result without incurring liability, but where someone puts another in 
danger, and where there is “no real choice,” a duty to rescue is created); see also Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that where the third party 
“willingly provide[d] the essential published content,” the service provider retains immunity). 
 235. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164 (“Roommate created the questions and choice of 
answers, and designed its website registration process around them.  Therefore, Roommate is 
undoubtedly the ‘information content provider’ as to the questions and can claim no immunity 
for posting them on its website, or for forcing subscribers to answer them as a condition of 
using its services.”). 
 236. See Harman, supra note 234, at 171–74 (providing a fuller discussion of the proposed 
indicia). 
 237. Id. 
 238. See supra note 107.  Some scholars suggest that assessing the commercial value of the 
content collected is also important to this analysis as it drives the objectives of the company 
and its use of data. See Harman, supra note 234, at 172–73 (2009) (noting that, when assessing 
the level of development, the court can look to whether there was an incentive for the particular 
information collected because “it is logical to conclude the site has a stake in the outcome of 
the user’s selection and therefore encourages it”). 
 239. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1169. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 1167 (“Roommate is not entitled to CDA immunity for the operation of its search 
system, which filters listings, or of its email notification system, which directs emails to 
subscribers according to discriminatory criteria.”). 
854 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
noted Roommates.com’s decision to design “its search system so it would 
steer users based on the preferences and personal characteristics that 
Roommate itself forces subscribers to disclose” barred it from immunity.242 
The court differentiates between “neutral” search tools, which can receive 
immunity, and nonneutral tools, such as those utilized by 
Roommates.com.243  Because Roommates.com’s survey-based services 
allowed the platform to limit available options for certain users and override 
“user-defined” filter options, the platform did not qualify as a neutral tool.244  
A nonneutral tool is one that aligns results of a search to limit listings 
available based on preferences that the program knows about the user.245  In 
this instance, required information from a user determined the basis of the 
information that Roommates.com would show to a user, thus affecting the 
very discrimination against roommates that the FHA sought to eliminate.  
This limitation, based on the system’s knowledge of the user, destroyed 
immunity for Roommates.com as it was seen as interference with content that 
went beyond that of a publisher.  In contrast, search tools that have no 
underlying information about the user have no potential to silently effect the 
information a user receives from a publisher. 
3.  The Underlying Illegality Test for Assessing “Development” 
In response to the question whether Roommates.com could lose immunity 
due to the answers Roommates.com solicited in its survey, the court 
“interpret[ed] the term ‘development’ as referring not merely to augmenting 
the content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged 
unlawfulness.”246  This language about “unlawfulness” caused the most 
apparent rift with the dissent and created a difficult standard to apply.247  
Differentiating the augmentation of content generally from the augmentation 
of content that contributes to illegality is not useful where general content 
development will not require immunity due to the absence of underlying 
illegality.248 
The dissent argues that assessing illegality tarnishes the court’s 
impartiality by addressing the underlying claim in the same breath as the 
 
 242. Id.; see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 
F.3d 921, 929 (9th Cir. 2007) (“By categorizing, channeling and limiting the distribution of 
users’ profiles, Roommate provides an additional layer of information that it is ‘responsible’ 
at least ‘in part’ for creating or developing.”), modified on reh’g en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 243. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1169. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See id. 
 246. Id. at 1167–68 (clarifying the point by adding that “a website helps to develop 
unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially 
to the alleged illegality of the conduct”). 
 247. See id. at 1166 (“Unlawful questions solicit (a.k.a. ‘develop’) unlawful answers.”). 
 248. See id. at 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (“Immunity has meaning only when 
there is something to be immune from, whether a disease or the violation of a law.  It would 
be nonsense to claim to be immune only from the innocuous.”). 
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available immunity.249 It argues that this interpretation strains the textual 
bounds of the statute.250  Finally, the ultimate result of this case demonstrates 
the awkward legal ramifications of characterization of actions as “illegal” 
before the claim is adjudicated.  This Part addresses the two main concerns 
raised by the dissent and the uncomfortable outcomes that arise out of this 
standard. 
The primary concern is the bias introduced by discussion of substantive 
liability in relation to the immunity analysis.  The dissent argues the issue of 
immunity should not be biased by a judge’s cursory review of the pleadings, 
as the two issues are analytically distinct.251  Judge M. Margaret McKeown 
states that the holding is flawed as it considers the analysis “built on 
substantive liability.”252  She states that there must be procedural respect 
given to adjudication of the merits of the claims “[i]nstead of foreshadowing 
a ruling on the FHA.”253  The dissent’s concerns are somewhat validated as 
the majority occasionally abandons the modifier “alleged” when referring to 
the “discriminatory” actions of Roommates.com.254 
The majority addresses the dissent in a footnote, and claims that the 
definition “does not depend on finding substantive liability” but “merely 
requires analyzing the context in which a claim is brought.”255  The court 
agrees that “finding that a defendant is not immune is quite distinct from 
finding liability” but continues in the body of the decision to note 
Roommates.com’s discriminatory conduct.256  In this footnote, it states its 
test without the use of the “underlying illegality” claim, saying:  “the CDA 
provides no immunity to Roommate’s actions in soliciting and developing 
the content of its website.”257 
The second critique of this formulation of the word development is that it 
goes beyond the meaning of the statute.  The dissent notes that there is no 
mention of “unlawfulness” in the statute.258  The statute contemplates 
culpability when it provides for “Good Samaritans,” and yet never writes a 
good- or bad-faith requirement into the statute.  Similarly, the dissent notes 
that there is no definition of the word “development” that connotes any type 
of negativity or unlawfulness.259 
 
 249. Id. at 1182 (“The majority’s definition of ‘development’ epitomizes its consistent 
collapse of substantive liability with the issue of immunity.”). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. (“Whether Roommate is entitled to immunity for publishing and sorting profiles is 
wholly distinct from whether Roommate may be liable for violations of the FHA.”). 
 252. Id. at 1182–83 (“[T]he majority’s immunity analysis is built on substantive liability:  
to the majority, CDA immunity depends on whether a webhost materially contributed to the 
unlawfulness of the information.”). 
 253. Id. at 1178. 
 254. Id. at 1172 (majority opinion). 
 255. Id. at 1171 n.30. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. at 1182 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (“Where in the statute does Congress say 
anything about unlawfulness?”). 
 259. Id. (noting that “[t]his definition . . . springs forth untethered to anything in the 
statute”). 
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Finally, outcomes produced by the underlying illegality language are 
potentially contradictory.  As noted earlier, in 2012, when Roommates 
returned to the Ninth Circuit on the issue of the FHA violation, the court ruled 
that there was no FHA violation.260  The 2012 ruling expressly indicated that 
the First Amendment protected this type of roommate selection within a 
dwelling.261  The court, however, did not acknowledge this when it discussed 
the 2008 ruling in the 2012 decision.262 
Scholars who have considered this decision have characterized this 
language as imprecise and unhelpful.263  So, while Roommates was pivotal 
in giving new meaning to the term “development” and providing tools for 
future courts to assess the ISP-content relationship, it created problems as 
well. 
D.  The Aftereffects of Roommates 
Roommates had immediate and lasting reverberations.  A spike in CDA 
legal scholarship followed the controversial opinion,264 as did many cases 
approaching the statute in a more nuanced manner.265  This section discusses 
how courts approached § 230 cases after Roommates.  Specifically, it breaks 
down the two key shifts that evolved out of the decision in Roommates:  the 
redirection of the definition of “development” and the scrutiny of what 
publisher conduct includes. 
1.  Culpability Refocused:  Conduct as a Means of Doing Business 
Outside of the Ninth Circuit, other circuit courts began to wrestle with the 
meaning of “development” more intently.  When unpacking Roommates’s 
underlying illegality language in FTC v. Accusearch,266 the Tenth Circuit 
analyzed the plain meaning of the words “develop” and “responsible” in the 
statute.267  The court found that to develop something was to make the 
content “usable,” “visible,” or “active.”268  It held that an ISP is “responsible” 
 
 260. See generally Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 
666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 1219. 
 263. See Doty, supra note 202, at 131 (“As might be expected, decisions following 
Roommates.com have not applied the underlying illegality test consistently.  Instead, the case 
law seems to reflect two different approaches to defining culpable behavior:  one based on 
‘solicitation’ and the other on ‘inducement.’”). 
 264. JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., FORDHAM CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY, SECTION 230 OF 
THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT:  A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND REFORM 
PROPOSALS 9 (2012), http://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/1825/clip_section_ 
230_of_the_communications_decency_act_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4NP-N73K] 
(noting that in the late 2000’s there was a spike of literature that rose up in defense of broad 
immunity and that since 2007—the year the first Roommates decision came out, before the en 
banc hearing—there has been a renewed stream of scholarly articles).  
 265. See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2009) (spending 
paragraphs discussing the meaning of both “development” and “responsible” in the statute). 
 266. 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 267. Id. at 1197. 
 268. Id. at 1198. 
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where it is “more than a neutral conduit for that content” and has “specifically 
encourage[d] development of what is offensive about the content.”269  This 
standard hinges on the ISP’s awareness of its conduct and moves away from 
the awareness of specific illegal content.  The court evoked a type of moral 
accountability for the development of the offending content, evocative of 
proximate causation, but it did not implicate a criminal “illegality”-type 
standard.270  In so doing, the Tenth Circuit created a sort of “culpability-
toward-development” standard, rather than a “culpability-toward-illegality” 
standard. 
The assessment of the culpability-toward-development standard for ISPs 
was also taken up in NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc.271  In this case, StubHub lost 
immunity because, while not intending to aid illegal scalping, it enabled it by 
providing technology that allowed users to mask the location of the seats they 
were selling.272  This masking technology prevented sports franchises from 
being able to pinpoint the ticket holders who were selling their seats.273  
StubHub was found to have developed the illegal information not because 
their conduct of masking seats was illegal but because it allowed the 
information to be processed in a manner that enabled the content at issue 
(tickets being sold in violation of antiscalping laws) to be sold.274  This 
material contribution to the content at issue was enough to convince the court 
that StubHub relinquished immunity.275 
More recently, the holdings in Roommates and Accusearch were recast by 
the Seventh Circuit in Huon v. Denton.276  The explanatory parentheticals 
were devoid of any consideration of the underlying claim as unlawful, illegal, 
or immoral.  Rather, the standards evoked when citing those cases speak to 
the requiring or solicitation of potentially neutral information in the conduct 
of business.277  While some state courts still invoke the illegality standard, 
 
 269. Id. at 1199. 
 270. See id. at 1198 (“In this context—responsibility for harm—the word responsible 
ordinarily has a normative connotation. . . .  [O]ne definition of responsible [i]s ‘[m]orally 
accountable for one’s actions.’” (first, second, and third alternations in original) (quoting 
Responsible, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 742 (2d ed. 1998))). 
 271. No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009). 
 272. Id. at *13. 
 273. Id. at *8. 
 274. Id. at *12. 
 275. Id. 
 276. 841 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 277. See id. at 742.  The decision characterizes Roommates as “concluding that a website 
was not a ‘passive transmitter of information provided by others’ but instead helped develop 
the information by ‘requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condition of 
accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers.’” Id. (quoting 
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166–
67 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).  The decision characterizes Accusearch as “concluding that a 
website developed the information by ‘solicit[ing] requests’ for the information and then 
‘pa[ying] researchers to obtain it.’” Id. (quoting FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 
1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
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the standard is tempered by language that considers the design of the website 
and demands made of the user.278 
2.  ISP Conduct in Relation to Content at Issue:  
What Would a Traditional Publisher Do? 
The first post-Roommates decision was also from the Ninth Circuit and 
dealt primarily with distinguishing the duties of publishers from those of ISPs 
in § 230 cases.  Months after Roommates was decided, the Ninth Circuit took 
the opportunity to engage with the second prong of the Zeran analysis—
whether the cause of action treats the ISP as a publisher.  In Barnes v. Yahoo!, 
Inc.,279 the plaintiff brought a traditional defamation claim regarding third-
party posted commentary but also brought a claim for promissory estoppel.280  
While the first claim was barred, the second claim was not.  This was because 
the second claim did not have to do with the content directly, but rather the 
fact that Yahoo! had breached a “contract” by promising to remove the 
content and failing to do so in a reasonable amount of time.281  This court 
distinguished the claims by assessing the ISP’s duties toward those parties 
for each claim.  Where the ISP, independent of publication, had made a 
legally enforceable agreement, the ISP would not be excused from that 
agreement merely because it related tangentially to the duties of 
publication.282 
The concurring opinion in Accusearch also highlighted some distinctions 
about the responsibility for the conduct toward the content at issue rather than 
the responsibility for the content itself.283  While this analysis was not part of 
the holding, it demonstrates a departure from the blanket immunity granted 
by earlier courts and a willingness to use the window Roommates and Barnes 
opened.284  This line drawing of ISPs’ actions as distinct from those of a 
publisher continues to appear in recent opinions in the Second Circuit and the 
 
 278. See, e.g., People v. Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814, 833 (Ct. App. 2016) (noting that 
the website was “designed to force” the divulgence of information in order to participate). 
 279. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 280. Id. at 1107 (“[Contract law] generates a legal duty distinct from the conduct at hand, 
be it the conduct of a publisher, of a doctor, or of an overzealous uncle.”); see also Julia M. 
MacAllister, Note, The Doxing Dilemma:  Seeking a Remedy for the Malicious Publication of 
Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2458 (2017). 
 281. See id. 
 282. See id. at 1101–02 (“[C]ourts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the 
defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’  
If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.”). 
 283. See FTC v. Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he FTC sought and ultimately held Accusearch liable for its conduct rather 
than for the content of the information it was offering on the Abika.com website.  Section 230 
only immunizes publishers or speakers for the content of the information from other providers 
that they make public.”). 
 284. It was also the main reason the Judge William Downes provided in the district court 
decision affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., No. 06-CV-105-D, 2007 
WL 4356786, at *6–7 (D. Wyo. Sept. 28, 2007), aff’d, 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(discussing whether the conduct at issue sought to treat the ISP as a publisher and holding that 
regardless of that fact, the solicitation and resale of third party information fell within the 
bounds of creation or development).  
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Ninth Circuit.285  Courts have crafted effective congressional intent 
arguments to support narrowing of immunity by asserting that holding ISPs 
liable for their nonpublisher actions does “not discourage the core policy of 
section 230(c), ‘Good Samaritan’ filtering of third party content.”286 
In the most robust example of pushback against blanket immunity, a court 
held that even where the act of publication is involved, if the user’s content 
is assembled to create a new impression on the viewer and is mobilized for 
profit, the conduct of publication becomes “development.”  This case, Fraley 
v. Facebook, Inc.,287 established that a sponsored post, which consisted of a 
user’s image and the fact that they had “liked” a product on Facebook, 
constituted development because the ad generated by third parties changed 
the meaning of the user content.288  Facebook argued that the “like” and the 
profile picture were both content provided by users and so were not 
developed by the ISP; but the impression that the action and the image 
ultimately created allowed Facebook to monetize them in a way that 
constituted a new use.289  This is significant because, even though the action 
of publication was involved, the fact that Facebook—through its automated 
assemblage of the information—created a piece of content that was regarded 
as “new” demonstrated the fullest expression of the pendulum’s swing in the 
other direction.  The new line for actions that differentiate publishers from 
content providers can account for the effect that the assembled content has 
on the viewer. 
III.  A NEW FRONTIER:  SECTION 230 DOCTRINE REENVISIONED 
FOR THE CHALLENGES OF MACHINE-LEARNING ALGORITHMS 
ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
This Part proposes a revised framework to analyze immunity, applies that 
framework to a case that implicates Facebook’s algorithmically based 
services, and addresses the concerns associated with the outcomes.  Part III.A 
outlines a reenvisioned test for § 230 immunity that incorporates the elements 
recently deployed by circuit courts as well as elements suggested by scholars.  
This test is then applied in Part III.B to a case recently decided in district 
 
 285. See FTC v. Leadclick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2016) (withholding 
immunity and holding Leadclick “accountable for its own deceptive acts or practices—for 
directly participating . . . by providing edits to affiliate webpages, for purchasing media” and 
because the liability did not “derive[] from its status as a publisher or speaker”); Doe v. Internet 
Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that there was no immunity where 
the content was not at issue, but rather the ISP’s liability derived from its conduct in failing to 
warn). 
 286. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852. 
 287. 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  The court noted that Facebook “ignores the 
nature of Plaintiffs’ allegations, which accuse Defendant not of publishing tortious content, 
but rather of creating and developing commercial content that violates their statutory right of 
publicity” and held that immunity could not apply as a result of that development. Id. at 801.  
The court was not persuaded that this statutory claim even treated Facebook as a publisher 
because the grouping of content “transformed the character of Plaintiffs’ words, photographs, 
and actions into a commercial endorsement to which they did not consent.” Id. at 802. 
 288. Id. at 792.  
 289. See id. at 799 (discussing the profit Facebook earned from selling sponsored posts).  
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court, which alleges that Facebook committed both tortious and statutory 
violations by aiding a foreign terrorist organization in the commission of 
terrorist attacks.  The framework addresses the structural ambiguities that 
machine-learning algorithms may present to the court and suggests a 
solution.  Finally, Part III.C discusses the rationale for this analysis and 
addresses concerns that may arise from its application. 
A.  The Zeran Framework 2.0 
The Zeran framework has undergone major analytical augmentation290 
that has not been formally recognized in judicial opinions.  While the first 
prong has become an ancillary question, the second and third prongs have 
evolved beyond the simple inquiries that the Fourth Circuit initially 
considered.  As such, this Note proposes an updated framework to address 
the complexity that algorithmically based services pose.  While the first and 
second questions of the Zeran framework require little, if any, formal change, 
the third prong requires a more thorough approach to “development” that 
includes consideration of the ISP-user and ISP-content relationships.291 
The first question of the proposed revision remains the same:  whether the 
defendant-ISP qualifies as an ISP under the statute.  Social media networks, 
as providers of interactive services, will win on this issue of immunity.  The 
second question—whether the claims treat the ISP as a publisher or speaker 
of the content at issue—requires courts to consider the distinct conduct 
alleged by each claim.  Where the cause of action springs from publisher 
conduct (harm through editing, disseminating, or deleting), the claim is 
barred.  But, where the claim does not, it must be considered outside the realm 
of immunity.292 
The third question requires the most in-depth reformation.  When 
considering whether the content was wholly provided by another content 
provider, the court must first determine what content forms the root of the 
action brought.  Where that content is created or developed by the ISP, 
immunity cannot apply.  Determination of creatorship is relatively simple, as 
demonstrated in Roommates,293 but determination of development requires 
further inquiry. 
To determine whether the content at issue is codeveloped by the ISP, the 
court must inquire into the ISP-user relationship and the ISP-content 
relationship.  The consideration of development fashioned in this way is 
devoid of any hint of “illegality,” and thus avoids the pitfalls of such an 
analysis.294  Consideration of the ISP-user relationship and the ISP-content 
relationship requires the complaint to identify the offending content and 
allows the court to assess the claim with more precision while sidelining the 
question of “illegality.” 
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The ISP-user relationship assesses the amount of user control relative to 
the ISP control exercised over the content at issue.  ISP control is evaluated 
by assessing whether use of the service is contingent upon obtaining specific 
information and what degree of choice a user has when submitting that 
content.295  The ISP-content relationship assesses an ISP’s relationship to the 
gathered content—specifically to its organization and use.296  Analysis of this 
relationship looks to whether the ISP has a vested interest in the ingestion of 
the content and whether content organization is specifically designed to aid 
the business objectives of the ISP.297  When combined, where content is 
required as a contingency of service and the ISP requires that the user divulge 
the information within specific parameters required by a business, there is 
most likely “development” of content to the extent that the ISP had sufficient 
control in the input to alter the end content.  This combination is evocative of 
the culpability-toward-development standard used in Accusearch.298  This 
standard ultimately views development of content as purposeful, but not 
necessarily malicious or illegal.  Where the contribution to such content 
makes the content more effective, the publisher can be seen as reaching 
beyond publication and into the realm of codevelopment.299 
B.  The Application of the Framework to Cohen 
There have been two cases consolidated for consideration in the Eastern 
District of New York that hinge on the issue of § 230 immunity.  The first 
seeks to implicate Facebook for negligently aiding terrorist connections, 
meetings, and event attendance through its ability to curate engaging content 
for each person’s predicted interests.300  The second claims a statutory 
violation of the material-support statute for aiding and abetting a terrorist 
organization.301 
The factual background of both cases is similar.  Both actions are brought 
against Facebook because of its alleged role in the incitement of terrorist 
attacks carried out by Hamas, a group formally recognized as an FTO by the 
United States.302  The plaintiffs were either injured in the attacks or are 
family members of the deceased.  The attacks range from bombings to 
stabbings that have occurred in Israel.303  Hamas has formally taken 
responsibility for some of the attacks.304 
In Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.305—which is also the name of the consolidated 
case—the Cohen complaint alleges that Facebook acted negligently under 
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Israeli statutory tort law and as a result alleges a breach of statutory duty 
claim and vicarious liability claim under Israeli law.306  The complaint also 
alleges prima facie tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and it 
seeks declaratory judgment for civil conspiracy.307  It states that § 230 should 
not apply.308  The Force complaint alleges that Facebook “knowingly 
provided material support and resources to Hamas” in contravention of the 
material-support statute.309 
Each claim’s success depends on the content at issue.  Some of the content 
at issue is the actual profiles, groups, and events that terrorists have 
created.310  Claims deriving from this content will likely be barred by § 230 
where Facebook merely passively allows the content’s existence.  A claim 
that requires Facebook to remove content can be dispatched under step two 
of Zeran.311  But, where the complaint alleges that the conduct was outside 
the realm of publisher or that the content was codeveloped by the company, 
Facebook could lose immunity.  This strategy is outlined in the framework 
below. 
Under the revised framework, there are two separate points at which 
Facebook could lose immunity.  The first appears under step two of Zeran:  
the argument to be considered is that Facebook’s conduct as a social 
networking service, and not publisher, has aided the effectiveness of the 
content-at-issue.  As such, Facebook could lose immunity where the claim 
doesn’t treat it as publisher.  The second arises under the codevelopment 
exception for publisher immunity.  The argument here is that Facebook 
intentionally creates an engaging and influential space in the “race to the 
bottom of the brain stem”312 that not only amplifies users’ messages but 
changes their potency.  This argument shows that the medium is a new 
message where the augmentation of user-generated content’s effectiveness 
actually encourages both the duplication of violent messages and the 
enactment of violent ends. 
1.  Facebook:  A Traditional Publisher? 
Under step two of Zeran, where Facebook merely allows for content to be 
created by third parties online, it is entitled to immunity.  But to what extent 
do Facebook’s algorithmically driven services—such as the exposure of 
users with common interests to each other or exposure to events or groups 
with nefarious motivations—go beyond those of a traditional publisher? 
 
 306. Cohen Complaint, supra note 9.  To avoid the discussion of conflict of laws, for the 
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 311. See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (granting 
immunity to Facebook for a claim that sought to hold them liable for failure to remove a user’s 
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 312. Bosker, supra note 87. 
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In Cohen, Cohen’s complaint seeks to deny immunity to Facebook because 
its conduct—via its services—has materially contributed to the effectiveness 
of dissemination and networking of a known FTO.313  The plaintiffs allege 
that the system’s ability to bucket and categorize people based on their 
interests makes Facebook more than a mere publisher.314  The complaint 
makes clear that the content at issue is the connective tissue of the website, 
specifically the algorithms: 
Facebook’s algorithms suggest friends based on such factors as friends of 
friends, group membership, geographic location, event attendance, 
language, etc.  Thus, Facebook purposefully provides users who have 
expressed an interest in the “Knife Intifada” or stabbing Jews, by joining 
groups or attending events with those themes, with friend suggestions of 
other like-minded people, and thereby helps to build large groups of people 
sharing and cultivating similar bigoted hatreds and murderous 
inclination.315 
These connective services are not those of a traditional publisher.  It is not 
“the very essence of publishing”316 to assemble personalized suggestions 
based on historical knowledge of a user.  However, given past courts’ reliance 
on underlying policies of § 230, specifically the utilitarian aspect of relieving 
ISPs of the duty to monitor,317 the court may deem these services within the 
scope of publisher conduct.  An alternate interpretation would require the 
intensive monitoring originally deemed impractical. 
To overcome the purposivist argument that the statute is meant to relieve 
the ISP of a publisher’s duty to monitor, the court could assess the level of 
technological advancement a site utilizes in providing these services.  To the 
extent that the algorithms are bucketing users and organizations as “interests:  
Knife Intifada,” the site may reasonably have the capability to monitor 
potential violence.  But, as machine-learning algorithms do not operate with 
such transparency, this capability is likely to be grouped in the publisher 
camp, and, as such, to be protected by § 230. 
The second prong of the Zeran analysis may require discussion of the 
operation of the algorithms that drive the services.  The court must either 
conduct limited discovery to demonstrate whether the services are the type 
that congressional intent would indicate fall into the scope of § 230 
immunity, or whether new, nonpublisher technology is easily subject to 
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monitoring.  Assuming that the algorithmically driven connective services 
cannot effectively be monitored due to their opacity, Facebook will likely be 
considered a publisher with respect to these claims. 
2.  Assessing Codevelopment 
There are two distinct claims that can be made under the development 
prong of the Zeran analysis.318  The first considers the content at issue to be 
the terrorists’ expanded network and claims Facebook is a codeveloper of 
these relationships.  The second considers the content at issue to be the 
organization of content that a user engages with; the claim being that this 
organization saps the user of enough control as to constitute codevelopment 
of the content that user views and is inspired by. 
In assessing the codevelopment prong, the first step is to assess the ISP-
user relationship to determine whether the actions taken constitute 
development.  In this analysis, the central considerations are (1) whether the 
collection of information is required as a contingency of use and (2) whether 
the ISP limits the parameters of the expression of that information.319 
The assessment of the ISP-user relationship where the content at issue is 
the introduction of terrorists to new recruits likely cuts against Facebook.  
Under the first ISP-user issue, the data collected about a user’s interests is 
required by Facebook, and under the second question the types of 
engagement Facebook tracks are limited and controlled wholly by the 
company.  This type of limitation of expression combined with the users’ 
required participation, however, is not dispositive of the issue. 
The second major consideration is the ISP’s use of the user’s content:  the 
ISP-content relationship.  Where the content at issue is terrorist relationships, 
Facebook cannot fairly be considered the “creator” or “developer” of a 
relationship because while Facebook suggests connecting users, the fact that 
users have ultimate control over the acceptance of the suggestions from 
Facebook is key.  Facebook neither forced the users together nor initiated 
contact between them, and therefore cannot be held liable here.  Thus, the 
platform likely will not lose immunity as a codeveloper for connective 
services with minimal suggestive influence. 
However, where the content at issue is the suggestive organization of 
content, which incorporates the power that the medium-as-message has over 
the user, the issue becomes more difficult to determine.  The first 
consideration of the ISP-user relationship cuts against Facebook where the 
collection of behavioral data and network data320 cannot be controlled by the 
user.  Granting Facebook the license to use this data is a required condition 
of using the platform.321  Therefore, the information used to assemble the 
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content to be as engaging as possible is content in its own right that is gleaned 
from the user without user-defined controls.  The resulting display of third-
party content is similarly created and displayed using engagement-focused 
organization rather than user filters. 
Second, when considering whether there are adequate options for 
expression of the information required by the ISP, one must look to the 
information being required from the user and what control the user has over 
the manner in which collection occurs.  This does not fit neatly into a 
prepopulated select-a-box or additional-comments type of analysis as in 
Roommates.  The issue giving rise to liability in Roommates was that the 
prepopulated questions had suggested answers and limited the possible 
answers to those suggestions.322  When assessing Facebook’s content 
control, this can be likened to the top posts, suggested posts, recommended 
events, or groups posts that are on the page.  This consideration is not 
dispositive against Facebook because, while Facebook can suggest friends, 
events and posts, the user also has the open search box to use.  However, in 
Roommates, it was not the presence of the opportunity to select all categories 
from a drop-down menu that made the profiles lose immunity; rather, it was 
Roommates.com’s limitation of the options that lost immunity.  This 
consideration cuts slightly against Facebook where a newsfeed, minimally 
controllable by users, appears to be curated to engage the user through subtle 
psychological forces, rather than overt user action.323 
The second consideration—the ISP-content relationship—also cuts against 
Facebook.  While users own the content and information on Facebook and 
are free to post what they wish, Facebook gleans information from that 
content.324  User content and the data gleaned from user content have 
materially different functions and are not analogous.  The former is used for 
communication between users while the latter is used by Facebook to conduct 
its business of creating engaged users and selling their attention to 
advertisers.325  The processing that goes into each users’ newsfeed is the 
result of behavioral analysis conducted on the user and the users’ network.  
This aggregated information is then applied to the personalized information 
of users to create the highest engagement rate. 
Finally, as to culpability and the material contribution to development, 
Cohen’s complaint makes plain that Facebook is aware of its active role in 
creating engagement.326  This fact is magnified by the studies Facebook has 
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conducted.  Facebook is aware of the mechanisms that allow FTOs to 
network and incite effectively and categorize them before they are deployed 
on profiles.  By processing this information, the complaint alleges that 
Facebook “has the technical ability to monitor the material that appears on 
its websites.”327  The complaint alleges that Facebook’s acknowledgement 
that sophisticated algorithms are behind the categorization and matching 
makes it more than a mere passive conduit with respect to users’ 
information.328  Indeed, Facebook uses the data “actively [to] direct those 
who are most interested in carrying out Terror Attacks to the incitement that 
will lead them to their goal, and . . . introduce[] the inciters to people who are 
interested in murder.”329  It is the algorithmic introduction of engaging 
content, and not the content itself, that is at issue here. 
Further, the civil conspiracy claim alleges that “[a]t all relevant times, 
defendant Facebook knew that those users posting incitement to commit 
Terror Attacks were utilizing defendant’s Services in order to direct their 
murderous Incitement to the widest possible audience of individuals most 
likely to act upon it.”330  The complaint brings the allegation one step further 
by implicating Facebook’s knowledge of its own ability to incite action 
among people by stating that Facebook knew the information disseminated 
“likely would result in Terrorist Attacks targeting plaintiffs, causing the harm 
to plaintiffs set forth herein.”331 
Where Facebook merely posts information to the page of the user and the 
pages of other users, there is not codevelopment.  But where the platform has 
gleaned new information from user content and user behavior, in order to 
create a site architecture that affects both mood and behavior, influence can 
be likened to the limitation of profiles emailed to users in Roommates332 or 
the creation of new content found in Fraley.333  The platform uses knowledge 
it has gathered from users to better understand their needs and to run a more 
effective business. 
C.  The Rationale Behind Denying Immunity Where the Content at Issue Is 
Subject to “Development” or Where the ISP’s Conduct, Rather than the 
Content, Is at Issue 
As technology becomes more sophisticated, the approach to § 230 
immunity must become more nuanced.334  Determining a set of principles to 
guide the application of § 230 is critically important to society and global 
business operations.335  Blanket immunity may have been satisfactory when 
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the primary concern was defamation,336 but claims are no longer confined to 
traditional tort liability for traditional publishers’ actions.  Instead, they are 
rooted in the consequences that new manifestations of technology have on 
the physical world.  Section 230’s purpose was to protect ISPs from the 
liability posed by creating the space for speech, but liability is no longer 
derived solely from amplification of third-party conduct.  ISPs once provided 
a soapbox and a bullhorn but now craft elaborate set designs of user content; 
as such, they are worthy of accreditation where applicable.  Courts must 
understand and analyze the precise allegations, and the relationships between 
the content and the users, before assigning labels to content providers and 
ISPs. 
While courts’ traditional broad construction of § 230 immunity can act as 
a shield to discovery in close cases, a framework that considers the 
appropriate ISP-user and ISP-content relationships should be applied where 
the technology in question may have a hand in development of information 
or where the conduct of that technology is the source of the alleged harm.  
The importance of a judicial shift toward more nuanced evaluation is 
paramount because it opens the doors to liability.  This shift may spur 
consideration of the ethical considerations that have long gone unaddressed 
in the development of algorithmic technology.337  Thus, any bar to giving 
more power to these considerations is not one that should be casually granted. 
The ability to appropriately assign liability based on algorithmic 
configuration will determine the course of computer-science education338 
and will determine the transparency we require of companies’ online 
behavioral analyses.  If judges cannot articulate a clear manner in which to 
approach issues of algorithmic site architecture, then society will need to fill 
in the gaps with additional legislation.  But that is not the necessary 
conclusion.  In fact, it is one that should be avoided.  Punting this issue back 
to the legislature will leave the determination of normative liability in the 
hands of the most powerful and influential people in the public sphere—the 
ISPs and their lobbyists.339  It will also detract from the flexibility that the 
judiciary provides in close cases. 
While innovation is good for business, there should be some check in place 
whereby ISPs can be held liable for the services, and not the content, that 
they provide.  A judicial solution will afford the greatest flexibility to 
determine, in highly fact-specific instances of algorithmic development, 
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whether development has taken away user control with respect to the content 
at issue. 
CONCLUSION 
While § 230 has aided the development and growth of the internet, that 
purpose has to a large extent been served.340  Internet companies are some of 
the most powerful341 and profitable342 in existence.  Broad civil and criminal 
immunity should no longer blindly be granted where new technology 
drastically changes the analytical foundations of preceding case law.  The 
internet has outgrown § 230 immunity as a broadly applied doctrine.  The 
narrowing of immunity as more statutory claims are brought is evidence of 
that.343  Defamation and other tort claims that rely on simple fact patterns to 
assign vicarious liability to “publishers” should, due to free speech interests 
and justiciability concerns, continue to be dismissed pursuant to § 230.  But, 
algorithmic technology that springs forth distinct from user-generated 
content and is powerful enough to influence human behavior should be given 
due consideration in a revised framework, instead of obtaining customary 
immunity.344 
Facebook is aware that the way in which it disseminates material has a real 
effect on users.  It is also aware that such dissemination affects the brain 
differently than the way a “traditional” publisher’s dissemination affects the 
brain.  Because of these considerations, some of Facebook’s services do not 
fall within the bounds of immunity.  Some of its actions, though akin to 
publication (services that disseminate user content to the masses), are 
conducted with knowledge and intent to have a substantive effect on users’ 
mental state furthered by the intentional development of data.  Where 
allegations incorporate the effects of social, emotional, and behavioral 
contagion powered by data gleaned from users’ interactions into their claim, 
a platform like Facebook will fall outside of § 230’s immunity. 
A solution that compels discussion and disclosure of at least some of the 
technology being deployed forces accountability for the powerful 
mechanisms at play.  This will catalyze responsible decision-making in 
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technology sectors moving forward.  No longer will the mindless activation 
of base human impulses be the driving factor and main concern of the ISP.  
The ISP will shoulder the burden of potential liability for the services it 
provides that have broken the boundaries of the publisher role.  As a result, 
perhaps more responsible technologists will mean that fewer victims of 
terrorist incitement will have to turn the other cheek. 
